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INTRODUCTION
Next to the “granting instrument”2—either an oil and gas lease in the
United States and parts of Canada, or a host country agreement
elsewhere—probably the most important type of contract governing oil
and gas exploration and production rights is the joint operating agreement
(often called a “JOA”). A joint operating agreement typically is entered by
parties that each own exploration and production rights in the same tract
or in nearby tracts that the parties believe should be operated in a
coordinated fashion.
Often, the parties to a JOA will co-own exploration and production
rights throughout the entire area governed by the JOA under a single
granting instrument. This is sometimes the case in the United States, and
it is typically the case in other countries, where sovereign ownership of
minerals is the general rule and granting instruments may cover large
areas.
Other times, the area governed by the JOA consists of multiple, nearby
tracts, and different parties to the JOA may own exploration and
production rights in different tracts under separate granting instruments.
In such cases, the companies holding those rights sometimes enter a JOA
2. The “granting instrument” is the contract or other instrument by which an
entity that owns the right to explore for and produce minerals grants the right to
conduct exploration and production operations to someone else for a finite length
of time. In most countries, the sovereign is the entity that owns oil and gas found
naturally in the subsurface, as well as the exclusive right to explore for and
produce those substances. In contrast, in the United States and parts of Canada,
there is private ownership of minerals. Typically, mineral ownership is part of the
bundle of rights that a landowner has. Accordingly, the landowner typically owns
the minerals associated with his or her land, unless the landowner (or a
predecessor-in-interest) has permanently alienated those rights, creating a “split
estate” in which one person owns the land, but another person owns the minerals
and the right to explore for and produce them.
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to facilitate their joint operation of the separate tracts in a coordinated
fashion. Occasionally, different companies will hold operating rights in
the same tract, but pursuant to different granting instruments. Or, the
exploration and production rights of one (or more) of the parties to the
operating agreement may be based on that party’s ownership of either the
land itself or a severed mineral interest, rather than on holding rights under
a granting instrument.
In any of these cases, however, the purpose of the joint operating
agreement entered by the parties is to govern the exploration and
production process, as well as the parties’ rights and duties with respect to
one another. Joint operating agreements almost always name one of the
parties as the “Operator” and vest that party with the exclusive right to
operate the parties’ mineral interests in the area where the agreement
applies, which is often called the “Contract Area” or something similar.
This Article covers issues relating to the Operator,3 including such
topics as the selection of the Operator, the relationship between the
Operator and non-operator parties, the duties of the Operator, the standard
of care to which the Operator is held, resignation and removal of
Operators, the selection of a successor Operator after an Operator resigns
or is removed, whether Operators can assign the Operatorship, and the
potential right of non-owners (persons who do not own an operating right
in the mineral interests covered by the agreement) to serve as Operator.
To some extent, this Article will cover general legal principles and
practices relating to the position of Operator, but the Article also will give
special attention to how various issues are covered under certain model
form joint operating agreements. Such attention is merited because,
although some parties draft their own operating agreements, it is very
common for parties to use model forms as their joint operating agreements.
Further, there are a handful, but only a handful, of commonly used forms.
This means that certain model forms are used with sufficient frequency to
justify discussion of the forms, but such forms are few enough in number
that a comparison of the forms in a law journal article is feasible.

3. Many joint operating agreements capitalize “Operator.” When discussing
specific provisions of those agreements, it sometimes would be appropriate for
this Article to capitalize “Operator,” even if the Article was not quoting the
provision. On the other hand, when this Article is discussing general principles
regarding the position of operator, it probably would be appropriate under rules
of grammar to refrain from capitalizing “operator.” But in writing this Article, the
author found that in some sentences it was difficult to decide whether “Operator”
or “operator” was more appropriate. For convenience, “Operator” will henceforth
be used throughout the Article except in any quotation that used “operator” or
when referring to the reasonably prudent operator standard.
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In the United States, the most commonly used model form for onshore
joint operations is the AAPL Form 610.4 The first version of the Form 610
was the 1956 version. Later versions include the 1977 version, 1982
version, 1989 version, a version of the 1989 form that was modified in
2013 with suggested revisions for use with horizontal wells, and finally
the “2015” version, which was released in 2016. This Article often starts
the discussion of a particular issue by considering how relevant provisions
in the 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 address the issue, after which this
Article considers how analogous provisions in earlier versions of the
AAPL Form 610 deal with the issue. (The earlier versions of Form 610
remain relevant because parties sometimes use the earlier versions of the
forms when entering new agreements and also because many older
agreements, which parties entered before the newer versions of the form
became available, remain in effect today.) Sometimes, particularly when
different model forms take a very similar approach, the examination of
some forms will be reserved for footnotes to avoid discussion of multiple
very similar provisions in the text of this Article.
The model forms that will be discussed in this Article include the:
• AAPL Form 610 (2015), as well as the 1989, 1982, 1977,
and 1956 versions of Form 610, and AAPL 610-HN (a
version of the 1989 Form 610 modified for use with
horizontal wells)
• AAPL Form 710-2002 (hereinafter, “AAPL 710”)
(designed for offshore)
• AAPL Form 810 (2007) (designed for deep water
operations) (hereinafter, “AAPL 810”)
• Rocky Mountain Joint Operating Agreement Form 3
(“Rocky Mountain Form 3”)
• CAPL 20075 (a form often used in Canada) (hereinafter,
“CAPL”)
• 2012 AIPN Model Form6 (a form commonly used
internationally)
• UKCS 20097 (a form used on the United Kingdom’s
4. “AAPL” is an acronym for the American Association of Professional
Landmen, formerly known as the American Association of Petroleum Landmen.
The AAPL has produced a number of model forms, with the most commonly used
perhaps being the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreements.
5. “CAPL” is an acronym for the Canadian Association of Petroleum
Landmen.
6. “AIPN” is an acronym for the Association of International Petroleum
Negotiators.
7. “UKCS” is an acronym for the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. “Oil
and Gas UK,” a trade group, developed the UKCS 2009 form.
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continental shelf) (hereinafter, “UKCS”)
• AMPLA (an Australian form).
I. THE INITIAL SELECTION OF OPERATOR
As a general rule, it would be inefficient if more than one of the parties
to a joint operating agreement attempted to conduct operations.8
Accordingly, model form joint operating agreements almost always
provide that a single party will be designated as the “Operator,” and only
the Operator will have authority to conduct most operations.9 This is true
8. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A
Comparative World-Wide Analysis §§ 2.01 and 6.01 (Lexis Nexis 2016); CLAUDE
DUVAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION
AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY ASPECTS, 289 (2d ed. 2009).
9. The 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610 each
provide in Article V.A for the designation of an Operator that will have “full
control of all operations.” Similarly, Paragraph 5 of the 1956 version of AAPL
Form 610 provides for an Operator that would have “full control of all
operations.” See also AAPL 710 art. 5.1; AAPL 810 art. 5.1.
In the 2012 AIPN Model Form JOA, Article 4.1 provides for designation of an
“Operator” and Article 4.2 provides that the Operator “shall have exclusive charge
of Joint Operations, and shall conduct all Joint Operations.”
Clause 6.1 of the AMPLA Form provides for appointment of the “Operator” and
Clause 7.2 provides that “the Operator is entitled to have possession and control
of all Joint Venture Property and must, either itself or through such third parties
as it may engage” perform various tasks, including joint operations.
Section 5.1 of the UKCS Form provides for designation of an “Operator” and
Section 6.1 provides that “the Operator has the right and is obliged to conduct the
Joint Operations by itself, its agents or its contractors.”
The CAPL Form provides for an Operator that is named in a “Heads of
Agreement” to which the joint operating agreement is attached. See CAPL art.
3.01; see also CAPL art. 1.01 (definition of “Heads of Agreement”). Further, art.
3.01 states that “the Parties delegate to the Operator, on their behalf, management
of the exploration, development and operation of the Joint Lands.”
Article 4.1 of Rocky Mountain Form 3 states that the “Operator shall direct and
have control of all operations conducted hereunder and shall have exclusive
custody of all materials, equipment, and other property owned by the parties.”
Of course, in addition to ensuring that multiple parties do not attempt to conduct
operations, it is important to make sure that someone conducts operations. The
same clauses that confer exclusive operational authority on the Operator often
also impose on the Operator a duty to conduct operations. See Section II of this
Article.
A potential exception to the general rule that the Operator perform all operations
concerns operations in which the Operator chooses not to participate—that is, it
chooses not to participate in the cost of a particular operation. Most operating
agreements provide for the possibility of operations in which some parties
participate and other parties do not. See, e.g., Art. V.B.2 of the 2015, 1989, 1982,
and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610; AAPL Form 710, art. 10.5; AAPL Form
810, art. 8.4; Rocky Mountain Form 3, § 9.3; 2012 AIPN art. 7; AMPLA cl. 13;
CAPL arts. 9.03 & 10; UKCS cl. 15. Under some operating agreements, if the
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for model forms used in the United States and those used elsewhere. The
2015 version of AAPL Form 610 is a typical example. It states that the
Operator “shall conduct and direct and have full control of all operations
conducted under this agreement as permitted and required by, and within
the limits of this agreement.”10
Typically, if parties contemplate agreeing to a JOA, they select an
Operator prior to executing the JOA as part of their negotiations regarding
the JOA (instead of executing a JOA and then selecting the Operator later).
Indeed, most standard JOA forms provide a blank for the parties to insert
the name of the party designated as Operator. This is the case with the
2015 version of AAPL Form 610. The first sentence of Article V.A of that
form begins: “
shall be the Operator of the Contract
Area….” In the 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions, the first sentence of Article
V.A begins exactly the same way.11
The parties to a joint operating agreement usually select the party with
the largest working interest to be the Operator,12 and some model forms
Operator chooses not to participate in a particular operation, the participating
parties have the option to request that the Operator perform the work on behalf of
the participating parties, but they also have the right to designate one of the
participating parties to conduct that particular operation. See, e.g., Art. V.B.2 of
the 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 AAPL Forms. See also AAPL Form 710 art. 4.2;
AAPL Form 810 art. 4.2; 2012 AIPN arts. 7.2.E.1 (optional provision) and 7.12.F
(optional provision); AMPLA cl. 13.3(a); CAPL cl. 10.04; UKCS cl. 15.2.9.
10. 2015 AAPL art. V.A. Older versions of AAPL Form 610, as well as other
model form joint operating agreements, contain similar provisions. In Article
V.A., the 1989 and 1982 Forms each stated that the Operator “shall conduct and
direct and have full control of all operations on the Contract Area as permitted
and required by, and within the limits of this agreement.” Article V.A of the 1979
Form had language that is identical, but for a comma after “limits of.”
11. The first sentence of Paragraph 5 of the 1956 AAPL Form begins:
“
shall be the Operator of the Unit Area….” Article 4.1 of the 2012 AIPN
Form begins: “
is designated as Operator…” The AMPLA Form
contains a blank for naming the actual Operator in Schedule 1 to the JOA. Article
5.1 of the UKCS form begins: “[ ] is hereby designated and agrees to act as the
Operator.” Article 4.1 of the 2002 AAPL Form 710 begins: “
is
designated as the Operator of the Lease.” Article 4.1 of the 2007 AAPL Form 810
begins: “
is designated as the Operator of the Contract Area.” In Rocky
Mountain Form 3, Article 1.5 begins, “‘Operator’ means
herein
designated as Operator. ..... ”
12. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 282 Ark. 268, 668
S.W. 2d 16 (1984) (plaintiff “was to be named the operator of the unit drilling
operations in as much as it had a predominant position …”); Scott C. Styles, Joint
Operating Agreements 375, in OIL AND GAS LAW—CURRENT PRACTICE AND
EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010) (“Usually, the JOA
member with the largest percentage interest in the JOA will be the operator….”);
CLAUDE DUVAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND
EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS, 289 (2d ed. 2009).
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clearly assume that this will be the case.13 Commentators have explained
that this typical practice is grounded in the rationale that the company with
the largest interest will have the greatest motivation to operate prudently
and efficiently.14 Further, the party with the largest ownership interest
often desires to be the Operator. Such a desire generally will not be based
on hopes of making a profit by serving in the role as Operator. As
discussed further in Section IV(C) of this Article, the Operator generally
is not entitled to make a profit from its service as Operator, though it is
entitled to reimbursement of its expenses. In part, the desire to serve as
Operator may arise from the attitude encapsulated in the old adage, “If you
want something done right, do it yourself.” But perhaps the primary reason
a company might wish to serve as Operator is that the Operator “de facto
has much more say” and control of operations than do any of the other
parties.15
Notwithstanding the general tendency to choose the party with the
largest ownership interest as Operator, parties are free to agree to the
selection of some other company as Operator. Parties sometimes do this,
particularly if a company with a smaller working interest has special
expertise or if there is some other reason why another company should
serve as Operator.16

13. The AMPLA Form provides that, “if the largest Participating Interest is
no longer held by the Operator,” the Operator’s term continues (assuming it does
not end for some other reason) “until the Operating Committee determines if and
when a new Operator should be appointed.” AMPLA cl. 6.2(c). AAPL Form 710
provides for the possible removal of the Operator if, because of an assignment to
a Non-Affiliate, its working interest is reduced to “less than the Working Interest
of a Non-operator.” AAPL Form 710 art. 4.4(c). The 2012 AIPN Form provides
for the possibility of removing the Operator if its ownership interest falls below a
specified fraction. See 2012 AIPN 4.10(C). The new 2015 AAPL Form 610
contains a provision whereby the parties can provide for that the Operator will be
deemed to have resigned if it loses or transfers more than a specified portion of
its ownership interest. 2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.2.
14. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A
Comparative World-Wide Analysis § 6.01 (LexisNexis 2016) (“The party with the
largest interest in the contract area is frequently selected as the operator under the
theory that this party has the most ‘skin in the game.’”); CLAUDE DUVAL ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY ASPECTS 289 (2d ed. 2009).
15. Scott C. Styles, Joint Operating Agreements 375, in OIL AND GAS LAW—
CURRENT PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed.
2010).
16. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A
Comparative World-Wide Analysis § 6.01 (LexisNexis 2016).
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A. The Requirement that the Operator Generally Must Own an Interest
Governed by the JOA
Many joint operating agreements either state or implicitly assume that
only a party who owns an interest governed by the agreement may serve
as Operator.17 For example, the 1989 and 1982 Versions of AAPL Form
610 seem to assume that the Operator must own an interest. Those forms
state that the Operator will “be deemed to have resigned” if it ceases to
own an interest that is governed by the joint operating agreement.18 AAPL
forms 710 and 810, which are designed for use offshore, contain similar
language about a “deemed” resignation.19 The 1977 version of Form 610
states that the Operator will “cease to be Operator” if it no longer owns an
interest.20 The 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 expressly states a general
rule that the Operator must own an interest, though it recognizes that
parties can agree to hire a “contract Operator” that does not own an
interest.21
Some of the other model form JOAs give parties to the agreement the
right to remove the Operator if the ownership interest of the Operator (or,
of the Operator and its affiliates together) falls below a specified level. The
AMPLA form and the two AAPL offshore forms each provide for the
possibility of removing the Operator if the Operator makes an assignment
of interest that results in any other party having a larger ownership share
than the Operator.22 The 2012 AIPN form contains an optional provision
that would allow the Non-Operators to remove the Operator if the
combination of the Operator’s interest and its affiliates’ interests falls
below a percentage that is to be specified by the parties (the form contains
a blank for the parties to fill-in with a percentage). The UKCS form
provides that the Operator may be removed if neither it nor its affiliates
holds an ownership interest.23
B. Selecting an Operator that Does Not Own an Interest
In most cases, the parties to a joint operating agreement choose one of
the owners of the interest governed by the joint operating agreement to
serve as Operator. Occasionally, however, the parties hire a non-owner to
17. Perhaps this is due to some of the same reasons that the parties typically
choose the party with the largest interest as Operator.
18. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1.; 1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1.
19. 2002 AAPL 710 art. 4.3; 2007 AAPL 810 art. 4.3.
20. 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1.
21. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
22. AMPLA cl. 6.2(c); 2002 AAPL 710 art. 4.4(c); 2007 AAPL 810 art. 4.4.1.
23. UKCS cl. 5.3.2(g).
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serve as Operator. Such non-owner Operators are sometimes called
“contract Operators.” A contract Operator might be a company that is not
affiliated with any of the owners, or it may be an affiliate of one of the
owners. One of the reasons owners of mineral interests typically avoid the
use of contract Operators is a concern that a contract Operator’s interest
will not be aligned with the owners, and that the contract Operator’s
primary interest will be to make a profit by serving as Operator, rather than
to maximize profits for the owners. Such non-alignments of interest can
occur in many types of commercial transactions, but that does not diminish
the concerns of some owners in the JOA context. The concerns may be
lessened somewhat if the contract Operator is an affiliate of one of the
owners, but even in those circumstances the concerns may remain.
The pre-2015 versions of AAPL Form 610 do not expressly address
whether the initial Operator must own an interest that is governed by the
joint operating agreement. But most of the pre-2015 Forms seem to
implicitly preclude the selection of a person that does not own an interest
under the agreement to serve as the initial Operator (of course parties
would be free to agree to deviate from the model language—either by
express revision or by simply choosing a non-owning Operator).24
The 2015 AAPL Form makes a change. It recognizes that, as a general
rule, the Operator must own an interest, but the parties can agree to a nonowning person serving as Operator.25 The Form provides, however, that
before a person that does not own an interest governed by the joint
operating agreement can serve as Operator, the person must either enter a
separate agreement with the Non-Operators to govern their relationship,
or insert Article XVI provisions into the agreement to govern the
relationship.26
C. Considerations in the International Context
In the international context, additional considerations may exist. For
example, outside the United States, mineral rights are typically owned by
the sovereign, rather than by private landowners; and the government
reserves the right to approve or disapprove the parties’ selection of an

24. Parties who choose to use an older form but deviate from the implicit
requirement that the Operator own an interest should be careful to make clear
whether their intent is to waive the ownership requirement for all future selections
of successor Operators under their joint operating agreement or just for the initial
selection.
25. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
26. Id.
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Operator.27 Indeed, the Operator often is named in the instrument by which
the government grants companies exploration and production rights.28
Sometimes, the government requires that its national oil company serve as
Operator.29
II. DUTIES OF THE OPERATOR
Joint operating agreements typically impose a variety of duties on the
Operator. For convenience, these can be grouped into three types of duty:
operational, financial, and informational and reporting. Each of these is
discussed below.
A. Operational Duties
An earlier section of this Article noted that joint operating agreements
give one party, known as the “Operator,” the exclusive authority to operate
in order to avoid the inefficiencies and other problems that might arise
from duplicative or conflicting operations by different parties.30 It also is
important, however, to ensure that someone conducts operations.
Accordingly, joint operating agreements typically impose on the Operator
a duty to operate. The 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 provides an
27. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A
Comparative World-Wide Analysis §§ 6.01 and 6.02 (LexisNexis 2016); Scott C.
Styles, Joint Operating Agreements 375, found in OIL AND GAS LAW—CURRENT
PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010) (in the
U.K., the choice of operator must be approved by government).
28. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A
Comparative World-Wide Analysis § 6.02 (LexisNexis 2016).
29. Id. § 6.01.
30. First, these provisions seek to avoid the possibility of duplicative or
conflicting operations by different parties by vesting exclusive operating authority
in one party. See Section I of this Article. Second, these provisions attempt to give
the Operator a degree of control over operations that is characteristic of the control
that an independent contractor has over the work it is hired to do (as opposed to
the lesser degree of control that is held an employee or agent who works under
the direction of the principal). For reasons that will be discussed in more detail
later, the parties to joint operating agreements often would prefer that the Operator
be classified as an independent contractor, rather than as the agent of the NonOperators. This issue will be discussed in Section IV of this Article.
These clauses typically do this with relatively little discussion, simply declaring
that the Operator shall conduct “all” operations or have “exclusive charge” of
operations or something similar. 2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.A (“shall conduct
and direct and have full control of all operations”); AAPL Form 710 art. 5.1
(“exclusive right and duty to conduct operations”); AAPL Form 810 (“the
exclusive right and duty to conduct (or cause to be conducted) all activities or
operations”); 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.A (“exclusive charge”); UKCS cl. 6.1.1 (“the
Operator has the right and is obliged to conduct the Joint Operations”).
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example. Article V.A, states that the Operator “shall conduct and direct . .
. all operations conducted under this agreement.”31 Similar or identical
language is contained in the earlier versions of AAPL Form 61032 and in
other model forms.33
Joint operating agreements do not specify the particular operations
that the Operator must perform. This lack of detail is unavoidable. Because
of the uncertainties involved in the exploration, development, and
production processes, it is not possible to spell out in detail the particular
wells to be drilled or reworked, the specific depth to which wells should
be drilled, and so forth. For this reason, many disputes regarding the
Operator’s conduct of operations will turn on whether the Operator has
complied with certain standards of conduct which are set forth in the JOA
(those standards are discussed in Section III of this Article), rather than
whether the Operator breached a specific duty.
Nevertheless, some operating agreements specify certain operational
duties in slightly more detail. As noted below, these include (1) duties
relating to testing, and (2) duties relating to drilling horizontal wells for
the distance and to the stratum that was proposed.
1. Duty to Test
Some model forms impose additional, somewhat more specific
operational duties. For example, Article V.D of the 2015 Form 610
(entitled “Rights and Duties of Operator”) imposes at least two additional
operating duties. Article V.D.7(c) requires the Operator to “adequately test
all Zones encountered within the Contract Area which may reasonably be
expected to be capable of production of oil and gas in paying quantities as
a result of examination of the electric log or any other logs or cores or tests
conducted hereunder.”34 This testing requirement is essentially identical to
the testing requirement contained in the 1989, 1982, 1977, and 1956

31. Article V of the 2015 AAPL Form is entitled “Designation and
Responsibilities of Operator.”
32. 1989 AAPL art. V.A; 1982 AAPL art. V.A; 1977 AAPL art. V.A; 1956
AAPL art. 5.
33. AAPL Form 710 art. 5.1 (“duty to conduct operations”); AAPL Form 810
(“duty to conduct . . . all activities or operations”); 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.A) (“shall
operate”); UKCS cl. 6.1.1 (“Operator . . . is obliged to conduct the Joint
Operations”).
34. “Zones” is defined to mean “a stratum of earth containing or thought to
contain a common accumulation of Oil and Gas separately producible from any
other common accumulation of Oil and Gas.” 2015 Form art. I.CC.
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Forms.35 The CAPL Form also imposes a duty to conduct tests.36 Other
forms seem to assume tests will be conducted without expressly mandating
a duty to test.37
The model forms that require the Operator to conduct tests do not state
with great specificity what tests must be conducted—and any attempt to
do so generally would be impractical.38 Accordingly, the resolution of any
dispute concerning an Operator’s failure to conduct a particular test likely
would depend on whether the failure constituted a breach of the standard
of care imposed upon the Operator, a breach of an agreement of the parties
relating to the testing of a particular well, or the breach of a binding drilling
plan.
Disputes can also arise if the Operator conducts a test, but a NonOperator asserts that the test should not have been conducted or that the
test was not done properly. For instance, sometimes Non-Operators object
to testing that they think is unnecessary because of concerns over costs or
the possibility that testing will damage the wellbore.39 If one or more NonOperators assert that the Operator incurred excessive expenses by
performing a test that was unnecessary or that the Operator performed a
necessary test in an improper manner, the dispute would be resolved based
on application of the standards of care imposed by the operating agreement
(the standard of care imposed by a JOA is discussed in Section III of this
Article).

35. The 1989 Form addressed this duty in Art. V.D.7. The 1982 and 1977 Forms
addressed testing in Article VI, entitled “Drilling and Development,” rather than in
Article V. In Article VI.A, the 1982 and 1977 Forms stated: “Operator shall make
reasonable tests of all formations encountered during drilling which give indication of
containing oil and gas in quantities sufficient to test, unless this agreement shall be
limited in its application to a specific formation or formations, in which event Operator
shall be required to test only the formation or formations to which this agreement may
apply.” The 1956 Form addressed the issue in Article 7.
36. CAPL cl. 7.03.
37. See, e.g., AMPLA cls. 1.1 (definition of “Good Australian Oilfield
Practice”), 9.1 (discussion of well completion).
38. The CAPL Form, which may contain the most detail regarding testing,
states that the Operator must “run agreed log surveys,” “test in accordance with
the approved program,” conduct “such further tests as are warranted of any
formations with showings of Petroleum Substances,” and “take such mud and
drillstem test fluid samples as are appropriate to obtain accurate resistivity, mud
filtrate and formation water readings.” CAPL cl. 7.03.
39. Andrew B. Derman, The New and Improved 1989 Joint Operating
Agreement: A Working Manual, 31 (this is No. 15 in the American Bar
Association’s “Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law Section
Monograph Series”).
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2. Duty to Drill to Objective Zones and to the Proposed
Displacement
Article V.D.7(d) of the AAPL Form 610 specifies an additional
operating duty:
For any Horizontal Well drilled under this agreement, Operator
shall drill such well to the objective Zone(s) and drill the Lateral
in the Zone(s) to the proposed Displacement unless drilling
operations are terminated pursuant to Article VI.G [relating to
circumstances in which drilling operations encounter granite or
other practically impenetrable substance or other difficulties] or
Operator deems further drilling is neither justified nor required.40
In earlier versions of AAPL Form 610, Article V (the Article that contains
most of the provisions relating to the Operator, including a specification
of the Operator’s duties) does not contain any similar language, but the
addition of this language to Article V in the 2015 Form may be less of a
change than first appears. In some earlier versions of AAPL Form 610,
Article VI (which governs provisions relating to drilling operations), the
model form stated that the Operator must continue drilling certain wells to
the planned depth except in certain circumstances, such as when the
drilling encounters impenetrable substances or other problems.41
Similarly, AAPL 710 provides that the “Operator shall diligently conduct
the operation . . . until the Objective Depth, unless the well encounters, at
a lesser depth, impenetrable conditions or mechanical difficulties that
cannot be overcome by reasonable and prudent operations.”42 The 2012
AIPN Form contains a very similar provision,43 and the CAPL form places
40. “Lateral” is defined as meaning “that portion of a wellbore of a Horizontal
Well between the point at which the wellbore initially penetrates the objective
Zone and the Terminus.” 2015 Form art. I. “Displacement” is defined having “the
same meaning as the term defined by the state regulatory agency having
jurisdiction over the Contract Area, in the absence of which the term shall
otherwise mean the length of a Lateral.” Id.
41. 1989 AAPL Form art. 610 art. VI.F; 1982 AAPL Form 610 art. VI.A;
1977 AAPL Form 610 art. VI.A; 1956 AAPL Form 610 art. 7.
42. AAPL Form 710 art. 10.7. In article 2.25, Form 710 defines “Objective
Depth” as, “A depth sufficient to test the lesser of the Objective Horizon or the
specific footage depth stated in the AFE and approved by the Participating
Parties.” Form 710’s article 2.26 defines “Objective Horizon” as “The interval
consisting of the deepest zone, formation, or horizon to be tested in an Exploratory
Well, Development Well, Deepening operation, or Sidetracking operation, as
stated in the AFE and approved by the Participating Parties.” See also AAPL
Form 810 art. 10.1.4).(b).
43. 2012 AIPN art. 5.13.D.1.

2019]

A COMPARISON OF OPERATORSHIP PROVISIONS IN OIL & GAS JOAS 93

restrictions on an Operator’s deviation from the plan approved by the
parties for a horizontal well.44
B. Financial Duties
Many operating agreements impose upon the Operator various
financial duties that are important for purposes of managing the “joint
account.” Often, operating agreements impose upon the Operator duties
to:
•
•
•
•

obtain competitive rates for goods and services,
manage the joint account and discharge its obligations,
protect the JOA assets against liens, and
act as a custodian of funds.

The most recent versions of AAPL Form 610 impose each of these duties.
As discussed in more detail below, other model forms, used in the United
States and elsewhere, impose similar sets of financial duties.
1. Duties to Obtain Competitive Rates
Because the Operator conducts all operations, the Operator typically
is the only party to the JOA that enters contracts for the performance of
work or for the provision of materials necessary to complete operations.
However, all parties to the JOA are responsible for paying their
proportionate share of the costs. Accordingly, JOAs typically impose upon
the Operator various duties relating to costs.
For example, the 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 require
the Operator to ensure that all wells are drilled “on a competitive contract
basis at the usual rates prevailing in the area.”45 Other forms used in the
United States46 and elsewhere impose similar duties. For instance, the
2012 AIPN form provides parties with a couple of options for the clause
44. CAPL cl. 8.02(B).
45. 2015 Form art. V.D.1; 1989 Form art. V.D.1.
46. AAPL Form 710 art. 5.7 states in part:
Insofar as possible, Operator shall use competitive bidding to procure good
and services for the benefit of the parties. All drilling operations . . . shall
be conducted by properly qualified and responsible drilling contractors
under current competitive contracts. A drilling contract will be deemed to
be a current competitive if it (a) was made within ( )months before the
commencement of the well and (b) contains terms, raters, and provisions
that, when the contract was made, did not exceed those generally
prevailing in the area for operations involving substantially equivalent rigs
that are capable of conducting the drilling operations.
See also AAPL Form 810 art. 5.3; Rocky Mountain Form 3 art. 4(9).
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to deal with this issue: Both options require the Operator to choose the
“best qualified contractor” based on a combination of cost, quality, and
ability, while one of the options would require the Operator to obtain
competitive bids for contracts above a certain monetary value.47 The
AMPLA Form requires the Operator to “obtain, evaluate and accept
competitive quotes” for contracts.48 The CAPL form states that the
Operator “will normally award contracts on a competitive basis” and the
UKCS form generally requires the Operator to award contracts on a
competitive basis if the cost of the contracts exceed a specified monetary
value.49
In addition to generally requiring the Operator to secure contracts that
contain competitive rates and terms, some model form joint operating
agreements contain provisions that are designed to protect the NonOperators against self-dealing by the Operator. For example, the 2015 and
1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 state that the Operator may use its own
tools and equipment in the drilling of wells, but if it does so, the Operator
must: (1) charge rates that do not exceed the rates prevailing in the area,
(2) obtain the other parties’ written consent to its rates before commencing
drilling operations, and (3) perform the work under the same terms and
conditions as are customary and usual for that geographic area in contracts
of independent contractors.50 The 1982 and 1977 Forms impose similar
requirements relating to competitive rates and the Operator’s use of its
own equipment.51 The offshore AAPL forms likewise contain such
requirements.52
Further, model form joint operating agreements often contain
provisions to regulate the costs, as well as other terms and conditions, of
any contract that an Operator enters with one of its corporate affiliates.53

47. 2012 AIPN art. 6.7.
48. AMPLA cl. 7.2(c).
49. CAPL cl. 3.03(B); see generally UKCS cls. 6.5.4, 6.5.5.
50. 2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.D.1.
51. 1982 AAPL Form 610 art. V.D.1; 1977 Form art. V.D.1.
52. See 2002 AAPL Form 710 art. 5.7; see also 2007 AAPL Form 810 art. 5(3).
53. The 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 do not expressly give
the Operator the right to use one of its own corporate affiliates to perform work
or supply materials, but the forms implicitly suggest that the Operator may do so.
Those forms state that “[a]ll work performed or materials supplied by an Affiliate
of Operator” must meet certain requirements, but the consent of the other parties
to the JOA does not appear to be a requirement. The forms state that all such work
performed, or materials supplied by an affiliate of the Operator must be done
“pursuant to written agreement.” One could argue that this provision means that
the Operator must obtain the written consent of the parties to the JOA, but in
context the provision appears to mean that anytime the Operator uses one of its
affiliates the Operator must do so pursuant to a written contract with the affiliate.
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The 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 illustrates this point. To the extent
that work is to be performed or materials supplied by an “Affiliate”54 of
the Operator, the 2015 Form provides that this must be done “at
competitive rates, pursuant to written agreement, and in accordance with
customs and standards prevailing in the industry.”55 This represents a
minor change from the 1989 Form. The 1989 Form imposes the substance
of this requirement, but it does so with respect to “affiliates or related
parties of Operator,” and neither “affiliates” nor “related parties” are
defined terms.56
The 2012 AIPN Form includes an optional provision which states that
“before entering into contracts with Affiliates of Operator exceeding” a
specified dollar value, the Operator must obtain the consent of the
Operating Committee.57 The UKCS Form similarly requires the Operator
to obtain the consent of other parties before providing materials or services
from its own resources or those of an affiliate, if the costs will exceed a

In contrast to the AAPL Form 610, the 2012 AIPN expressly authorizes the
Operator to hire its own affiliates. Article 4.2.A authorize the Operator to “employ
independent contractors and agents, including Affiliates of Operator, NonOperators, or Affiliates of a Non-Operator.” See also AMPLA cl. 7.7; but see
AMPLA cl. 7.10.
54. “Affiliate” is defined to mean:
for a person, another person that controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with that person. For purposes of this definition,
“control” means the ownership by one person, directly or indirectly, of
more than fifty percent (50%) of the voting securities of a corporation
or, for other persons, the equivalent ownership interest (such as a
partnership interest), and “person” means an individual, corporation,
partnership, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or
legal entity.
2015 AAPL Form 610 art. I.
55. 2015 AAPL Form art. V.D.1.
56. 1989 AAPL Form art. V.D1. Other than the 2015 Agreement’s providing
using the defined term “Affiliate” in Article V(D)(1), instead of using “affiliates
or related parties,” the financial duties imposed on the Operator by the 2015 Form
are the same as those imposed by the 1989 Form. Over time, however, there have
been some changes in the COPAS Form that is commonly attached as Exhibit C
to the APPL-610 joint operating agreements. This Article does not attempt to
address COPAS in detail, much less the changes that have occurred in the COPAS
Form over time. Further, any such changes do not change the basic nature of the
Operator’s financial duties.
The 1982 and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610 do not expressly address the use
of affiliates of the Operator.
57. 2012 AIPN art. 6.7. The alternative that includes this requirement
contains a blank that the parties to the joint operating agreement should fill-in to
specify the dollar value that will trigger the consent requirement.
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value specified in the JOA.58 The AMPLA form states that the Operator
may not contract with one of its affiliates (or with a Non-Operator or an
affiliate of a Non-Operator) to provide goods or services for joint
operations unless the contract is on “terms and conditions no less favorable
to the [parties to the JOA] than an arm’s length commercial agreement
with a Third Party supplier, and the proposed agreement has been
approved by the Operating Committee.”59
2. Management of Joint Account
Under the 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610, the Operator
must promptly pay “expenses incurred in the development and operation
of the Contract Area pursuant to the agreement,” and charge each of the
parties with their respective proportionate shares upon the expense basis
set forth in the JOA’s Exhibit C—the standard COPAS provisions.60 The
Operator must also keep an account record of the joint account, “showing
expenses incurred and charges and credits made and received.”61 In the
1982 and 1977 Forms, financial duties are not addressed in Article V, but
Article VI.C requires the Operator to promptly pay costs. The AAPL
offshore forms contain similar requirements.62
As with many other issues, Forms used outside the U.S. impose duties
similar to those imposed by the AAPL Forms. For example, the 2012
AIPN Form requires the Operator to “timely pay and discharge all costs
and liabilities incurred in connection with Joint Operations,” to “exercise
58. UKCS cl. 6.5.2(b). The UKCS Form contains a blank for the parties to
fill-in to specify the monetary value of a contract that triggers the requirement to
obtain consent from the other parties. Id.
59. AMPLA cl. 7.10. The quoted provision refers to the “Operating
Committee.” JOA forms used outside the United States often provide for the
creation of an operating committee that contains representatives of each party. See
2012 AIPN art. 5; AMPLA cl. 5; UKCS cl. 9 (“Joint Operating Committee”). The
operating committee typically exercises some authority over budgets and other
matters. See, e.g., AIPN art. VI.1.D; AMPLA cl. 8.2; UKCS cl. 10.1.2.
Necessarily, the Operator still controls day-to-day matters, but the use of an
operating committee may give the Non-Operators more oversight than they have
under the various versions of AAPL Form 610, which do not provide for an
operating committee.
60. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.2; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V(D)(2). (“COPAS” is
an acronym for Council of Petroleum Accounting Societies).
61. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.2; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.2.
62. Each of the two offshore forms requires the Operator to keep accurate
books and records. See 2007 AAPL Form 710 art. 5.5; see also 2002 AAPL Form
810 art. 5.5. Also, by requiring the Operators to seek to keep the contract area free
of liens, see 2007 AAPL Form 710 art. 5.3; see also 2002 AAPL Form 810 art.
5.4, the model forms implicitly require the Operator to promptly pay most
expenses.
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due care with respect to the receipt, payment and accounting of funds,” and
to charge all costs to the Joint Account in accordance with the “Accounting
Procedure.”63 The Accounting Procedure, a separate document that is
designed to be an exhibit to the JOA, requires the Operator to keep accurate
books and records.64 Other model Forms used outside the U.S. contain
analogous provisions.65
3. Protecting JOA Assets Against Liens
Many jurisdictions provide that if a contractor is not paid for its work
relating to certain property, such as oil and gas wells or production
facilities, the contractor may record a lien giving the contractor a security
interest in those facilities.66 Individual workers and suppliers of equipment
may be entitled to the same or similar protections.67 Many joint operating
agreements require the Operator to protect the jointly-owned assets against
such liens.
For example, under both the 2015 Form and the 1989 Form, the
Operator is required: to pay or cause payment of all accounts of contractors
and suppliers, as well as all wages and salaries, for all services and
materials provided for work under the parties’ agreement; and to keep the
area free of liens and encumbrances, except for any which arise from a
bona fide dispute as to the services or supplies.68 AAPL Forms 710 and
810 impose a similar requirement.69
As previously noted, in the 1982 and 1977 Forms, Article V did not
address financial duties of the Operator, but Article VI.C generally
required the Operator to promptly pay expenses. The 1982 and 1977
Forms did not expressly address protection against liens, except to provide
that, with respect to operations by less than all the parties, the Consenting
Parties would keep the operations free from liens.70
63. 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.9; 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.3; 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.4.
64. 2012 AIPN Model Form International Accounting Procedure § 1.4.1:
Operator shall at all times maintain and keep true and correct records of
the production and disposition of all Hydrocarbons, of all costs and
expenditures under the Agreement, and of other data necessary or proper
for the settlement of accounts between the Parties in connection with
their rights and obligations under the Agreement to enable Parties to
comply with their income tax and other legal and contractual obligations.
65. See, e.g., AMPLA cls. 7.5, 10; UKCS cl. 6.7; CAPL cl. 3.07.
66. See, e.g., Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act, LA. REV. STAT. 9:4861-4873
(2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-24-02 (2017); Oil and Gas Lien Act, N.M. STAT.
§§ 70-4-1 to -14 (2018); TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 56.001-56.006 (2017).
67. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4862(A)(3), (6) (2018).
68. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.3; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.3.
69. 2002 AAPL 710 art. 5.3; 2007 AAPL 810 art. 5.4.
70. 1982 AAPL 610 art. VI.B.2; 1977 AAPL 610 art. VI.B.2.
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Various standard forms used outside the United States impose similar
duties.71 Article 4.2.B.9 of the 2012 AIPN form is illustrative. It requires
that the Operator “timely pay and discharge all costs and liabilities
incurred in connection with Joint Operations and use its reasonable
endeavors to keep the Joint Property free from all liens, charges, and
encumbrances arising out of Joint Operations.” The standard AMPLA
form requires the Operator to “keep the Joint Venture Property free and
clear of all Encumbrances, except for those Encumbrances specifically
permitted under [the] agreement.”72
4. Acting as Custodian of Funds
Article V.D.4 of the 2015 AAPL Form 610 requires the Operator to
hold, for the account of the Non-Operators, any money that is paid to the
Operator by the Non-Operators or from sales of product from the Contract
Area, until such funds are (1) used for their intended purpose, (2) delivered
to the Non-Operators, or (3) applied toward debts as allowed under Article
VII.B of the agreement.73 (Article VII.B provides that the parties grant
liens to one another, and it governs those liens). Until the funds are used
or delivered to the Non-Operators, the funds being held by the Operator
continue to belong to the Non-Operator on whose behalf the funds were
paid or advanced, but the Operator is not required to maintain separate
accounts for such funds unless the parties have agreed otherwise.74 (Other
AAPL forms that address the issue also state that the Operator need not
establish a separate account.75)
Notably, Article V.D.4 of the 2015 Form suggests that the Operator
has a fiduciary duty with respect to any funds that it holds. The provision
states: “Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to establish a
fiduciary relationship between Operator and Non-Operators for any
purpose other than to account for Non-Operator funds as herein
specifically provided.” This suggests that the Operator has a fiduciary duty
for the limited purpose of accounting for funds, and by implication this
provision reinforces the rule that the Operator does not have a fiduciary
duty for most purposes. The 1989 version of AAPL Form 610 has a similar
provision.76
71. See, e.g., 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.9; AMPLA cl. 7.2(o); CAPL cl. 3.06;
UKCS cl. 6.3.
72. AMPLA cl. 7.2(o).
73. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4.
74. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4.
75. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4; 2002 AAPL 710 art. 8.5; 2007 AAPL 810
art. 6.1.
76. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4.
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The 2012 AIPN form contains an optional provision by which parties
can prohibit the Operator from commingling funds it receives from the
Non-Operators with the Operator’s own funds—thus, effectively requiring
the Operator to establish a separate account.77 The AMPLA Form requires
the Operator to pay costs and expenses incurred by the Operator in
operations, and for “such purpose to open, maintain and operate one or
more separate bank accounts (with which its own funds are not
commingled) on behalf of” the parties to the operating agreement.78 The
CAPL Form expressly authorizes the Operator to commingle funds, unless
parties holding a majority of the Non-Operator ownership interests request
otherwise, but the Form apparently anticipates that the Operator will have
fiduciary duties with respect to the funds that it holds.79
C. Informational and Reporting Duties
Under joint operating agreements, Operators generally have duties to
provide various information to regulators and the Non-Operators.
1. Reporting to Regulators
Often, statutes or regulations will require that certain information
regarding operations be reported to a government agency. Typically, it
would be inefficient and unnecessary for multiple parties to report the
same information to regulators, but the parties must ensure that someone
submits the information. Further, the Operator often will be in the best
position to prepare reports and submit information because the Operator is
the party that is handling day-to-day operations. Accordingly, model form
joint operating agreements often require the Operator to submit any reports
required by law. For example, Article V.D.6 of AAPL’s 2015 Form 610
states that the “Operator will file . . . all operational notices, reports or
applications required to be filed by local, State, Federal or Indian agencies
or authorities having jurisdiction over operations hereunder.” Prior
versions of Form 610 imposed a similar duty.80
77. 2012 AIPN art. 4.8.A.
78. AMPLA cl. 7.2(e).
79. CAPL cl. 5.07; CAPL cl. 1.05.
80. Article V.D.6 of the 1989 Form expressly imposes such a duty, using
language essentially identical to that in the 2015 Form. The 1982 Form does not
expressly impose such a duty, but it seems to assume that the Operator will file
such forms. Article VI.D of the 1982 and 1977 AAPL Forms describe the extent
of the Operator’s duty to furnish the Non-Operators with copies of “forms or
reports filed with governmental agencies,” thus implying that the Operator will
have copies of those forms or reports because the Operator has prepared and filed
them.
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A difference between the 1989 and 2015 Form is that the 2015 Form
expressly designates the Operator as the agent of the Non-Operators:
for the sole purpose of executing, filing for approval by a
governmental agency as required under applicable law or regulation,
and recording a declaration of pooling or communitization agreement
to effectuate the pooling or communitization of the [oil and gas leases
subject to the JOA] (to the extent legally allowed under their
respective terms and conditions) to conform with a spacing order of
a governmental agency having jurisdiction over any portion of the
Contract Area. However, such agency shall only be exercised by
Operator after providing written notice including a copy of the
proposed pooling declaration or communitization agreement to NonOperators, and shall be binding upon any Non-Operator failing to
produce to Operator a written objection with ten (10) days after such
notice.81
Similar to AAPL Form 610, the 2012 AIPN form requires the Operator to
provide all records, information, and reports that the granting instrument
requires of the parties.82 The AMPLA form generally requires the Operator
to “prepare, file and lodge all statutory reports as and when required” by
law.83 Most other model forms also impose such duties on the Operator.84
2. Providing Information to Non-Operators
Because the Operator conducts day-to-day operations, it typically will
possess all, or virtually all, information that exists regarding joint
operations and will have daily access to physical facilities involved in
operations. Non-Operators do not have this advantage, but within the oil
and gas industry, the prevailing view is that Non-Operators should have a
right to information and access. Accordingly, most operating agreements
expressly require the operator to provide information to Non-Operators.
But not all information is equally important, and it could be burdensome
for the Operator to collect and provide some types of information.
81. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
82. 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.11.
83. 2011 AMPLA cl. 7.2(k).
84. AAPL Form 710 requires the Operator to “make reports to governmental
authorities it has a duty to make as Operator.” 2002 AAPL 710 art. 5.8. The intent
of this provision probably is that the operator must submit all reports, other than
any reports that the law might require each working interest owner to submit (such
as income for purposes of income tax reporting). AAPL Form 810, section 5.6
contains a similarly-worded requirement. See also 2011 AMPLA cl. 7.2(k);
UKCS cl. 6.2.1(g).
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Therefore, JOAs typically specify the types of information that the
Operator must provide. Similarly, joint operating agreements typically
give Non-Operators a right of access to physical facilities to view and
inspect them, while imposing some reasonable restrictions or conditions
on such access in order to prevent undue interference with operations.
Also, it is notable that some JOAs give non-participating parties the right
to a narrow set of information and access rights than other parties to the
JOA.85
The 2015 version of AAPL 610 Form provides that the Operator must:
• notify Non-Operators of the date on which drilling
operations are commenced,
• send to Consenting Parties86 copies of all test results and
reports that they reasonably request,
• permit other parties—either each Non-Operator or each
Consenting Party (depending on the particular JOA)—full
access to all operations,
• provide other parties—either each Non-Operator or each
Consenting Party (depending on the particular JOA)—
access to operating records and other books and records
relating to each operation, and
• file with regulators all required notices, applications, and
reports, and upon request, furnish copies of such filings to
Non-Operators.87

85. Under most operating agreements, certain operations can proceed without
the unanimous consent of the parties. In such situations, each party typically will
be given the chance to participate in the project by agreeing in advance to pay its
share of costs or to “go non-consent,” and thereby not participate in the costs.
When a party elects not to participate and therefore not pay its share of costs, that
party generally is required to forego any share to the revenue from that
operation—either permanently or until (and unless) the operation is so successful
that revenue from the operation exceeds costs of the operation by a specified
factor. Typically, non-participating parties do not forfeit all rights to information
because they may have a right to share in revenue from the operation eventually,
assuming the operation’s revenue exceeds its costs by a sufficient margin, and
because the operation in which the party is not participating sometimes may affect
other operations under the JOA.
86. A “Consenting Party” is “a party who agrees to join in and pay its share
of the cost of any operation conducted under the provisions of this agreement.”
2015 AAPL art. I.D.
87. Article 5.1.F of Rocky Mountain Form 3 requires the Operator to supply
a similar set of information.
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It also requires the Operator to give the Non-Operators access to physical
facilities so that they can observe operations.88
A significant change between the 1989 and 2015 versions of AAPL
Form 610 is that under the 2015 Form, only Consenting Parties have the
right to access well locations and to receive test results, logs, operating
records, and most books and records relating to Operations.89 In contrast,
under the 1989 Form, all Non-Operators were entitled to such access and
information.90 Even under the 2015 Form, however, Non-Consenting
Parties are entitled to production amounts and, if they request an audit, the
information necessary to audit “the payout account.”91 Like the 2015
version of AAPL Form 610, the AAPL offshore forms require the
Operator to give a broad range of information to parties participating in an
operation, while significantly restricting the scope of information that nonparticipating parties are entitled to receive.92
The JOA forms used outside the United States similarly require the
Operator to provide information to Non-Operators.93 For example, the
2012 AIPN Form requires Operators to provide Non-Operators with:
copies of all logs and surveys; the proposed well design and any revisions
for each well; daily drilling reports; all tests, core data, and analysis
reports; a final well recap report; plugging reports; seismic sections, and
if applicable, shot point location maps; final (and if requested,
intermediate) geological and geophysical maps, interpretations, and
reports; engineering studies; and periodic progress reports.94 The 2012
AIPN Form gives non-participating parties the right to some information,
but also places some limits on their right to information.95
88. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.5; see also Rocky Mountain Form 3, art. 5.1.F
(giving Non-Operators the right to physical access).
89. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.5.b.
90. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D. Like the older versions of AAPL Form 610,
the portion of Rocky Mountain Form 3 that requires the Operator to provide
information to other parties does not distinguish between participating and nonparticipating parties. Rocky Mountain Form 3, art. 5.1.F.
91. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.5.a.; 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.5.c.
92. 2002 AAPL 710 art. 5.9; 2007 AAPL 810, art. 5.7.; 2002 AAPL710, art.
5.10; 2007 AAPL 810, art. 5.9.
93. See, e.g., 2012 AIPN art. 4.4.A; AMPLA cl. 7.1; CAPL cl. 7.02; UKCS
cl. 6.8.
94. 2012 AIPN art. 4.4.A. The form gives parties the option to specify how
often the Operator should provide progress reports.
95. 2012 AIPN art. 7.4.A. The CAPL form likewise gives Non-Operators the
right to information and access, CAPL cl. 7.02, but places some restrictions on
the access and information rights of non-participating parties. See CAPL art.
10.19. The UKCS form follows a similar pattern. See UKCS cls. 6.8 (Operator’s
duty to provide reports to other parties) and 15.2.8 (the right of parties not
participating in “sole risk” operations to some, but not all of the information
regarding sole risk operations).
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The AMPLA Form does not contain as detailed a list of the
information that the Operator must provide, but it nevertheless imposes
significant duties to supply information to the other parties. It requires the
Operator to submit certain information to the Operating Committee, to
provide reports that include “all well and reservoir reports” to
“Participants,” and to provide certain information regarding the joint
account to any party upon request.96 AIPN’s 2012 form also grants NonOperators the right to have representatives observe operations. Article
4.2.B.8 states:
Upon receipt of reasonable advance notice, [the Operator must]
permit representatives of any Party to have at all reasonable times
during normal business hours and at such Party’s own risk and
cost reasonable access to Joint Operations, to observe Joint
Operations, to inspect Joint Property, to conduct HSE audits, and
to conduct financial audits and to observe taking of inventory.
III. STANDARD OF CARE
A. The Standard Specified
Most operating agreements expressly impose a standard of care upon
the Operator. The specified standard often includes multiple components,
with typical components being requirements that the operator perform
work as a reasonably prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike
manner, consistent with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations. Some forms add an express requirement
that operations be conducted in compliance with the granting instrument.97
The standard specified in Article V.A of the 2015 Form is typical. It
requires that the Operator “conduct its activities under this agreement as a
reasonably prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due
diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in
compliance with applicable law and regulations.” The 1989 Form
contained an identical standard, while the earlier AAPL 610 Forms
required the Operator to conduct “all such operations in a good and
workmanlike manner.”98

96. AMPLA cl. 7.1(e); AMPLA cl. 7.1(f); AMPLA cl. 7.5(b).
97. For example, Article 5.1.C of Rocky Mountain Form 3 requires the
Operator to “[c]omply with the terms of the oil and gas leases [to which the JOA
applies] and with all applicable laws and regulations.”
98. 1989 AAPL 610, Art. V.A.; 1982 AAPL 610, Art. V.A; 1977 AAPL 610,
Art. V.A; 1956 AAPL 610, art. 5.
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Similarly, one of the AAPL offshore forms requires the operator to
“timely commence and conduct all operations in a good and workmanlike
manner, as would a prudent operator under the same or similar
circumstances,”99 while the other contains the same language, except for
replacing “operations” with “activities or operations.”100 Both require the
Operator to conduct operations in compliance with the law.101
Forms used outside the United States seem to impose analogous
standards.102 The 2012 AIPN Form requires the Operator to conduct all
joint operations “in a diligent, safe, and efficient manner in accordance
with good and prudent petroleum industry practices and field conservation
principles generally followed by the international petroleum industry
under similar circumstances,” and in compliance with the granting
instrument and “the Laws.”103 The AMPLA form contains similar
language, but also adds requirements relating to fair dealing, stating that
the Operator must “conduct Joint Operations in a good, workmanlike and
commercially impartial and reasonable manner in accordance with Good
Australian Oilfield Practice,”104 and that the Operator must “act in utmost
good faith in all its dealings, as Operator, with each” of the other parties.105
Of course, “good and workmanlike manner” refers to a general
standard of conduct. The parties to a JOA specify a standard of conduct
instead of attempting to specify exactly what the Operator must do in all
future circumstances because at the time the JOA is entered, the
circumstances that will arise in future operations are unknown and the
range of possible circumstances is unlimited.
It is probably impossible to define the “good and workmanlike
manner” standard, except in very general terms, but existing case law may
shed some light on the standard and how courts have applied it. In the
99. This requirement is contained in art. 5.2 of the AAPL Form 710.
100. AAPL Form 810, art. 5.2. art. 26.4 requires all Parties to comply with “all
laws, orders, rules, and regulations,” and article 5.10 requires compliance with
health, safety, and environmental regulations.
101. Article 5.6 of AAPL Form 710 requires the Operator to conduct
operations in compliance with the law. See also AAPL Form 810, art. 26.4.
102. Article 3.04 of the CAPL form requires the Operator to “conduct all Joint
Operations diligently, in a good and workmanlike manner, in compliance with the
Title Documents and the Regulations and in accordance with good oilfield
practice.”
Clauses 6.2.2(a) and (b) of the UKCS form require the Operator to “conduct the
Joint Operations in a proper and workmanlike manner in accordance with Good
Oilfield Practice,” and “in compliance with the requirements of the Acts, the
License, and any other applicable Legislation.”
103. AIPN art. 4.2.B.2; AIPN art. 4.2.B.1.
104. AMPLA cl. 7.1(c) (Section 1.1 of the AMPLA form provides a lengthy
definition of “Good Australian Oilfield Practice.”).
105. AMPLA cl. 7.1(g).
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context of a drilling contract that obligated a party to perform in a “good
and workmanlike manner,” a Texas appellate court expressed approval for
a definition providing that the work must be performed “as a person skilled
in that business should do it—in a manner generally considered skillful by
those capable of judging such work in the community of the
performance.”106 In a context outside the oil and gas industry, the Texas
Supreme Court defined “good and workmanlike manner” as meaning “that
quality of work performed by one who has the knowledge, training, or
experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation
and performed in a manner considered proficient by those capable of
judging such work.”107 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “good
and workmanlike” as meaning “[i]n a manner generally considered skillful
by those capable of judging such work in the community of its
performance.”108
Relatively few cases address the meaning of “good and workmanlike
manner” in the context of joint operating agreements. A few cases that
have addressed the standard in this context seem to have equated the “good
and workmanlike manner” standard with the “prudent operator” standard.
In Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc., non-operators brought suit against
the Operator in a Texas state court, complaining in part that the Operator
breached its duties by failing to bring a take-or-pay claim on behalf of the
parties to the operating agreement.109 The district court granted summary
judgment to the Operator, dismissing the claims that were based on the
failure to assert a take-or-pay claim.110
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate
court acknowledged that the joint operating agreement contained clauses
that could support the Operator’s argument that it did not owe a fiduciary
duty to the non-operators.111 But the court stated that even though the
Operator might not owe fiduciary duties, the Operator owed other duties
to the non-operators, including the duty to perform in a “good and
workmanlike manner.”112 The court concluded that this required the
Operator to “perform as a reasonably prudent operator.”113
The court went on to hold that, because the summary judgment record
did not preclude the possibility that a reasonably prudent operator would
106. Westbrook v. Watts, 268 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex. App. 1954).
107. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
108. Good and Workmanlike, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
109. 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App. 1992).
110. Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. App.
1992).
111. Id. at 716.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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have asserted a take-or-pay claim on behalf of the non-operators, the
portion of the summary judgment ruling that dismissed the plaintiffs’
complaint as it related to that issue should be reversed.114 This should not
be read as indicating that the prudent operator standard would require an
Operator to assert a take-or-pay claim on behalf of the non-operators.
Instead, the case merely stands for the proposition that this is a question of
fact. Thus, the primary importance of American Cometra is that: (1) it
equates the “good and workman manner” standard with the prudent
operator standard, and (2) it illustrates that the question of whether the
standard has been breached is an issue of fact.
Norman v. Apache Corp., was another appeal of a summary judgment
decision.115 The case was a diversity jurisdiction case that arose in Texas,
and the court cited American Cometra in support of the proposition that
the “good and workmanlike manner” standard required the Operator to act
as a reasonably prudent operator.116 Here, the Operator permanently
abandoned a unit well that the Operator asserted was no longer economic.
Although the well was the only well that was holding certain leases beyond
the primary term,117 the Operator did not inform the non-operators in
advance that it was abandoning the well. The leases that had been held by
the well’s production had cessation of production clauses118—some with a
60-day period and others with a 90-day period—but those periods had
already lapsed by the time that the Operator informed the non-operators
that the well had been abandoned.119 Thus, the leases were lost.
The non-operators filed suit, complaining that the Operator breached
its duties by not informing them in advance that it planned to permanently
abandon the wells. Based on certain portions of the operating agreement
114. Id. at 716, 718.
115. 19 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1994).
116. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1994) (case
removed from state court based on diversity jurisdiction). Id. at 1029-30 (equating
good and workman like manner standard and prudent operator standard).
117. In the United States, oil and gas leases are virtually always granted for a
primary term of specified length (typically a few years) and as long thereafter as
there is production of oil or gas in paying quantities. If the lease is beyond the
primary term, a well that is producing oil or gas in paying quantities, and which
thus is keeping the lease alive, is described as “maintaining” or “holding” the
lease.
118. A cessation of production clause is a type of savings clause. Such a clause
typically provides that, if a lease has been held by production after the primary
term and such production ceases, the lease will not terminate if the lessee takes
certain action—such as to re-establish production in the well, to commence
reworking of that well, or the commence drilling operations for a new well—
within some specified number of days. See Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M.
Kramer, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (14th ed. 2009).
119. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1994).
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that were quoted by the court, it appears that the parties may have been
using a modified version of the 1956 version of the AAPL Form-610. In
any event, the United States Fifth Circuit held that the operating agreement
did not expressly require the Operator to inform the non-operators in
advance about the permanent abandonment of a well, but that the district
court erred by granting summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim
that the Operator breached its duty to perform in a good and workmanlike
manner. Thus, Norman does two relevant things here—it (1) reinforces the
view that, at least under Texas law, the good and workmanlike manner
standard requires an Operator to perform as a reasonably prudent operator,
and (2) declares that whether this standard has been breached will be a fact
issue.
As for the reasonably prudent operator standard, much of the
jurisprudence relating to what it requires is found in the context of implied
covenant disputes between lessors and lessees. The descriptions of the
reasonably prudent operator standard found in those cases does not shed
much additional light on what the standard requires. The jurisprudence
merely suggests that the reasonably prudent operator standard requires an
Operator to take the steps that a reasonably prudent operator would take
in the same circumstances.
As a general rule, a non-operator who asserts that the Operator has
breached the reasonably prudent operator standard will need expert
testimony. Under certain facts, it might be clear to the average factfinder
that an Operator’s conduct does not satisfy this standard, but generally the
average juror or judge will not know what is required of a reasonably
prudent operator. For example, in Bonn Operating Co. v. Devon Energy
Production Co., a federal district court in Texas expressly concluded that
expert testimony would be needed to establish whether the Operator failed
to act as a reasonably prudent operator, thereby breaching the good and
workmanlike manner standard under an operating agreement.120 This
conclusion is consistent with court decisions that a lessor-plaintiff needs
expert testimony in order to establish that a lessee has breached implied
covenant duties under a lease (implied covenant duties are evaluated based
on a reasonably prudent operator standard).
If parties find themselves in a dispute regarding whether the Operator
met the required standard of care, the parties can look to previouslydecided cases for some guidance, but the circumstances faced by the
parties may not be a close match to the circumstances found in the
available cases. Further, the question of whether the Operator met the
standard of care is a factual question, and, even if the circumstances of the
120. 2009 WL 484218 (N.D. Tex.); The parties in Bonn Operating used the
1956 version of the AAPL Form 610.
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parties’ dispute happens to be a reasonably-close match for the facts of a
prior case, the factfinder in the parties’ dispute could reach a different
conclusion than the factfinder in the prior case.
Finally, although the discussion immediately above talks about parties
disputing whether the Operator has met its obligations to conduct
operations in a “good and workmanlike manner,” it is noteworthy that the
exculpatory clause found in many joint operating agreements will shield
the Operator from liability to the Non-Operators unless the seriousness of
the Operator’s lapse is much more severe than a mere failure to satisfy the
“good and workmanlike manner standard.” A later section of this Article
will discuss exculpatory clauses.
B. Attempts to Hold Operator to Fiduciary or Other Heightened
Standards
Non-operators sometimes attempt to hold Operators to heightened
duties, such as a fiduciary duty.121 Typically, they do this by arguing that
the relationship between the parties carries with it either fiduciary duties
or some heightened duty of loyalty. Because agents generally owe a
fiduciary duty to their principal,122 the principal-agency relationship is the
example of such a duty.123
Another way Non-Operators can argue that the Operator owes
fiduciary duties is by asserting that either the joint operating agreement,
the parties’ conduct, or both, establishes some relationship between all the
parties such that all parties owe fiduciary duties to one another. Such an
121. A fiduciary duty is “[a] duty to act for someone else’s benefit, while
subordinating one’s personal interest to that of the other person.” Fiduciary Duty,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). The Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation has previously published several excellent articles on joint operating
agreements, including some that discuss arguments regarding whether an operator
is subject to a fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Patrick H. Martin, Gas Balancing and Split
Stream Sales Under Joint Operating Agreements and Unit Operating Agreements,
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. SPECIAL INST. ON ONSHORE POOLING AND
UNITIZATION (2008).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 13 (“An agent is a fiduciary with
respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
AGENCY § 8.01 (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's
benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”); Johnson v.
Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002); Basile v. H & R
Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000); Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., 590 N.W.2d 433, 437 (N.D.
1999).
123. Section IV(A) of this Article discusses issues relating to whether the
Operator could be classified as an agent for purposes of all work it performs on
behalf of the Non-Operators. Section IV(B) of this Article discusses whether the
Operator could be classified as an agent for limited purposes.
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argument, if successful, would impose the same duty on all the parties,
rather than some special duty on the Operator. The existence of such a duty
could be particularly significant for the Operator; as the party that conducts
operations and bears certain other duties, the operator is most likely to be
on the “receiving end” of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a worldwide survey of
the various laws and business relationships that can establish heightened
duties between parties. Below, however, this Article gives an overview of
the elements necessary to establish a partnership, mining partnership, or
joint venture124 within the United States, followed by a brief discussion of
efforts by the AAPL Form 610 and other model forms to avoid the creation
of such relationships. The potential existence of such entities is important
because parties to those relationships often owe heightened duties to one
another.
1. Elements of Partnerships, Mining Partnerships, and Joint
Ventures
The elements necessary to establish a partnership, mining partnership,
or joint venture have certain similarities. For each of the three, a critical
element is the right of control, as can be seen by examining the elements
of a partnership.
a. Elements of a Partnership
Partnership law is now governed by statute in all 50 states. It appears
that all states other than Louisiana have adopted some version of the
Uniform Partnership Act, and, in Louisiana, partnerships are governed by
the Louisiana Civil Code.125 But the statutes governing partnerships—like
the common law that previously governed partnerships—impose high
standards of conduct upon partners. As a general rule, partners owe

124. Within the United States, “joint venture” typically means a business
relationship that is akin to a partnership, except that a “joint venture” generally is
entered for a single business deal or a specific area or for a limited time. This
Article acknowledges that, outside the U.S., some people may use “joint venture”
differently.
125. See, e.g., Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 894-5 (Tex. 2009) (stating
that Uniform Partnership Act had been adopted by all states other than Louisiana
and discussing, under Texas law, the change).
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fiduciary duties and duties of loyalty to one another,126 and they are agents
of the partnership.127
State law governs whether a partnership exists, but the elements or
factors necessary to create a partnership tend to be similar from one state
to another. The intent of the parties is an important element, but the
creation of a partnership does not necessarily depend on whether the
parties subjectively intended to form one.128 The critical factor with
respect to intent is whether the parties intended to create a business
relationship that contains the characteristics of a partnership—a business
carried on jointly for purposes of profit.129 In some states—such as Kansas,
New Mexico, and Oklahoma—statutes provide that “the association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms
a partnership.”130 In some other oil and gas states—such as Colorado,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming—the statutes governing
partnerships use very similar language in specifying what constitutes a
partnership.131 But co-ownership of property and a sharing of profits made
by use of the property alone are not sufficient to create a partnership.132 To
constitute a partnership, each owner must have a right of control.133
126. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2809; N.M. § 54-1A-404; OHIO REV. CODE
§ 1776.44; 54 OKLA. STAT. § 1-404; 15 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 8447; WYO. STAT.
§ 17-21-404. Under the Texas statutes governing partnerships, the duties are not
explicitly called “fiduciary” duties, but there are duties of loyalty, TEX. BUS. ORG.
CODE § 152.205, and of good faith, TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.204(b), and these
duties generally cannot be waived. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.002. Other states,
even those that refer to the existence of “fiduciary” duties, may also provide
expressly for duties of loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing that cannot be waived.
See, e.g., 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-103 (bar on waiver of certain duties), 1-404 (duty
of loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing).
127. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-109; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2809; N.M.
§ 54-1A-301; OHIO REV. CODE § 1776.31; 54 OKLA. ST. § 1-301; TEX. BUS. ORG.
CODE § 152.301; WYO. STAT. § 17-21-301.
128. Ziegler v. Dahl, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275 (N.D. 2005); Hillme v. Chastain,
75 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Mo. App. 2002).
129. Id.
130. 54 OKLA. STAT. § 1-202; N.M. STAT. § 54-1A-202; KAN. STAT. § 56a-202.
131. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-60-106 (definition of “partnership”), 7-60-107
(rules for determining whether a partnership exists); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-1301; OHIO REV. CODE § 1776.01; 15 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 8412 (nature of
partnership); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.051; WYO. STAT. 17-21-101.
132. 54 OKLA. STAT. § 1-202; N.M. STAT. § 54-1A-202; KAN. STAT. § 56a-202.
133. Ziegler v. Dahl, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275 (N.D. 2005); Al-Yassin v. AlYassin, 2004 WL 625757 *7 (Cal. App. 2004); Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 147 F.3d
674, 677-8 (8th Cir. 1998) (an element necessary for creation of a partnership is
“power of control in the management of the business;” North Dakota law); In re
Stewart, 1990 WL 10593999 *3 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990); cf. Hillme v. Chastain,
75 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Mo. App. 2002) (“A voice in the management of the
partnership enterprise . . . [is an] indication[] of a partnership”).
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Under Texas law, courts consider a list of five factors—none of which
are determinative—in evaluating whether a partnership exists.134 Factors
that weigh in favor of concluding that persons have created a partnership
include the fact they have: (1) received or have the right to share in the
profits of a business; (2) expressed an intent to be partners; (3) participated
or have the right to participate in control of the business; (4) have shared
or agreed to share losses and liabilities; and (5) contributed or agreed to
contribute money or profit into the business.135 Texas statutory law
specifically states that the mere fact that a mineral interest is governed by
a joint operating agreement will not establish a partnership.136
Louisiana law provides that “[a] partnership is a juridical person,
distinct from its partners, created by a contract between two or more
persons to combine their efforts or resources in determined proportions
and to collaborate at mutual risk for their common profit or commercial
benefit.”137 The terms of most joint operating agreements would satisfy the
majority of terms included within that definition, but Louisiana law
expressly provides that an oil and gas joint operating agreement “does not
create a partnership unless the contract expressly so provides.”138
In many jurisdictions, a disclaimer of partnership will not necessarily
be determinative, but it should be helpful in preventing parties from being
deemed partners when they do not wish to be. This is particularly true with
respect to the duties the parties owe one another. If the parties do not wish
to be partners, there is no reason that the law should impose upon them
partnership duties vis-à-vis one another. Further, the level of control that
most joint operating agreements give to the Operator may preclude the
joint right of management that is necessary for the existence of a
partnership.

134. Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at 895.
135. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.052.
136. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.052(b)(4).
137. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2801. Louisiana is largely a civil law or mixed
jurisdiction, even though it is part of the United States, where the common law
has predominated historically. The civil law has been more receptive to treating
partnerships as an entity. Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS § 9 at pp. 16-19 (West Publishing 3rd ed. 1983). The common
law applied the “aggregate” theory to partnerships. Id. Under that theory, a
partnership created a relationship between individuals—a relationship that had
certain consequences—but a partnership was not a separate juridical entity. But
now, all 49 states other than Louisiana have adopted some version of the Uniform
Partnership Act, and that Act largely treats partnerships as entities.
138. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:215. Depending on the meaning of “collaborate” and
the terms of a particular joint operating agreement, the “collaborat[ion]” element
might not be satisfied. Thus, even without LA. REV. STAT. § 31:215, the parties to
a joint operating agreement would not necessarily have a partnership.
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a. Elements of a Mining Partnership
Members of a mining partnership generally owe fiduciary duties to
one another.139 Whether a mining partnership exists is an issue of fact, but
the elements or factors necessary to establish a mining partnership are a
matter of state law.140 In Oklahoma, there are three elements of a mining
partnership: (1) a joint interest in the property; (2) an express or implied
agreement to share in profits and losses; and (3) cooperation in the
project.141 Under Oklahoma law, “cooperation in the project” means
“actively joining in the promotion, conduct or management” of a
project.142 The mere fact that an interest is governed by a joint operating
agreement is not sufficient to create a mining partnership.143 Such actions
as “[r]eceiving reports, questioning bills, and hiring a pumper to evaluate
[a] well in contemplation of taking over as operator” do not constitute
“cooperation in the project.”144
Much of the jurisprudence relating to whether a mining partnership
exists is brought by third persons who seek to have all the co-owners held
liable for the torts or contracts of one of the co-owners (usually the
operator), opposed to being cases brought by a co-owner seeking to hold
the Operator liable as a fiduciary. Often, the existence or non-existence of
a mining partnership turns on whether all of the co-owners had a right to
control operations. In the absence of such a right, a court generally will
find that a mining partnership does not exist. And often courts have found
that a mining partnership does not exist because non-operators lacked the
right to control operations.
b. Elements of a Joint Venture
A joint venture is similar to a partnership. The primary distinction
between a partnership and a joint venture “is that, while a [partnership] is
ordinarily formed for the transaction of a general business of a particular
kind, a joint venture is usually, but not necessarily, limited to a single
transaction, although the business of conducting it to a successful

139. Bufalini v. De Michelis, 288 P.2d 934, 937 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Smith
v. Bolin, 261 S.W.2d 352, 363 (Tex. App. 1953), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
271 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1954).
140. Spark Bros. Drilling Co. v. Texas Moran Exploration Co., 829 P.2d 951,
953 (Okla. 1991).
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Jenkins v. Pappas, 383 P.2d 645, 647 (Okla. 1963).
143. See Spark Bros. Drilling Co., 829 P.2d 951 at 953.
144. Id. at 954.
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termination may continue for a number of years.”145 Because joint
ventures are essentially partnerships for a limited purpose, joint ventures
generally are governed by the same rules that govern partnerships.146
Accordingly, parties to a joint venture owe each other fiduciary duties, just
as partners owe each other fiduciary duties.147
The mere facts that parties co-own an oil and gas lease and that they
have agreed that one co-owner will operate the lease on the parties’ behalf
are not sufficient to create a joint venture.148 On the other hand, the
existence of a joint operating agreement will not automatically preclude
the existence of a joint venture. In some cases, courts have found that a
joint venture existed.149 In other cases, courts have determined that a joint
145. Daily States Publishing Co. v. Uhalt, 126 So. 228, 231 (La. 1930). See also
Ben Fitzgerald Realty Co. v. Muller, 846 S.W.2d 110, 120 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1993)
(“The principle distinction between a joint venture and a partnership is that a joint
venture is usually limited to one particular enterprise.”); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 16, 16 (Ark. 1984) (“[A] joint venture is ‘in
the nature of a partnership of a limited character.”) (quoting Johnson v. Lion Oil
Company, 216 Ark. 736, 739 (Ark. 1950)); Boles v. Akers, 244 P. 182, 184 (Okla.
1925) (“A joint venture generally relates to a single transaction.”); Bebo Const. Co.
v. Mattox & O’Brien, P.C., 998 P.2d 475, 477 (Colo. App. 2000) (“A joint venture
is a partnership formed for a limited purpose
”); SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson,
718 N.W. 2d 580, 583 (N.D. 2006) (“A joint venture is generally considered akin
to a partnership, although more limited in scope and duration….”); Lightsey v.
Marshall, 128 N.M. 353, 357, 992 P.2d 904, 908 (N.M. App. 1999) (“a joint venture
‘is generally considered to be a partnership for a single transaction’”); Madrid v.
Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1118 (Wyo. 1979) (“The principal distinction between a
joint venture and a partnership is that a joint venture usually relates to a single
transaction.”); see also Henn, supra note 137, § 49 at 105.
146. SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 718 N.W.2d 580, 583 (N.D. 2006); Ben
Fitzgerald Realty Co. v. Muller, 846 S.W.2d 110, 120 (Tex. App. 1993); Cajun
Elec. Power Co-Op, Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So. 2d 212, 215 (La. App. 1984);
Boles v. Akers, 244 P. 182, 184 (Okla. 1925); Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108,
1118 (Wyo. 1979); see also Henn, supra note 137, § 49 at 107.
147. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 16, 17
(Ark. 1984); Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977); Madrid v.
Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1118 (Wyo. 1979); see also Henn, supra note 137, § 49
at p. 107.
148. Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.
1982) (“Joint owners of an oil and gas lease, may contract for the operation of
leases by one of them and for the operator, in the event of success, to pay to the
other joint owners one-half of the proceeds of the sale of the oil and gas less the
expenses of finding it, without creating a joint venture or a mining partnership.”).
149. Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977) (parties were “joint
venturers for the development of a particular oil and gas lease;” nevertheless,
plaintiffs were denied recovery because joint venture did not extend to the
property that was at issue in the litigation). As one commentator noted, “the mere
existence of an agreement between an operator and non-operator is not sufficient
to avoid [the existence of a fiduciary] duty.” Christopher S. Kulander, Old Faves
and New Raves: How Case Law Has Affected Form Joint Operating Agreements—
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venture did not exist.150 State law determines the elements necessary to
create a joint venture, but whether a joint venture exists in any particular
case will be a fact issue that depends on the terms of the parties’ agreement
and perhaps on their conduct.151
In Texas, four elements are necessary for the existence of a joint
venture: (1) a community of interest in the venture; (2) an agreement to
share profits; (3) an agreement to share losses; and (4) a mutual right of
control or management of the enterprise.152 A community of interest is
defined under Texas law as “a commonly shared incentive between the
parties as to the progress and goals of the joint venturers.”153 Under most
joint operating agreements, at least three of the four elements of a joint
venture will exist—a community of interest, an agreement to share profits,
and an agreement to share losses. Accordingly, if parties dispute whether
a joint venture exists, the determining issue often will be whether the
parties have a mutual right of control and management.154 A mere right to
receive information or to visit the drill site is not sufficient control to
support the existence of a joint venture.155
In Oklahoma, three elements are needed to establish a joint venture:
“1) A joint interest in property (the contributions need not be equal or of
the same character), 2) An express or implied agreement to share profits
and losses of the venture, 3) Action or conduct showing cooperation in the
venture.”156 Under Colorado law, the elements necessary to establish a
Problems and Solutions (Part One), 1 OIL AND GAS, NAT. RES., AND ENERGY J. 1,
11 (2015). Instead, courts will consider whether the terms of the agreement “create[]
a partnership, joint venture, or agency relationship that may trigger a fiduciary
duty.” Id.
150. Ayco Development Corp. v. G.E.T. Service Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186
(Tex. 1981); Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App.
El Paso 1982).
151. Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 So. 2d 350 (La. 1972); Cajun
Elec. Power Co-Op, Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So. 2d 212, 216 (La. App. 1984); see
also Price v. Howard, 236 P.3d 82, 91 (Okla. 2010) (existence is a question of
fact); Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1118 (Wyo. 1979) (question of fact). The
agreement that supports the existence of a joint venture can be either express or
implied. Pillsbury Mills, Inc. v. Chehardy, 90 So. 2d 797, 801 (La. 1956).
152. Ayco Development Corp. v. G.E.T. Service Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186
(Tex. 1981); Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App.
1982).
153. Metroplexcore, L.L.C. v. Parsons Transp., Inc., 743 F.3d 964, 973 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 17 F.3d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1994)).
154. This has been the decisive issue in several cases. See, e.g., Ayco
Development Corp. v. G.E.T. Service Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1981);
Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App. 1982) (no
joint venture because operator “had full control of all operations”).
155. Ayco Development Corp. v. G.E.T. Service Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186
(Tex. 1981).
156. McGee v. Alexander. 37 P.3d 800, 806-7 (Okla. 2001).
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joint venture are essentially the same. Courts have stated that a party must
prove the existence of three elements in order to show that a joint venture
exists—“(1) A joint interest in the property; (2) an agreement, express or
implied, to share in the losses or profits of the venture; and (3) actions or
conduct showing cooperation in the project. No one of these elements
alone is sufficient.”157 The law is very similar in most other states.158 Thus,
whether or not the non-operators have a right of control tends to be the
deciding issue in disputes regarding whether a joint venture exists.
Based on the non-operator’s lack of control, courts often have found
that a joint venture did not exist, but, in some cases, courts have found that
the parties’ relationship constituted a joint venture. If a joint venture exists,
one of the consequences of the fiduciary duty or duty or loyalty owed by
each co-owner could be a duty not to compete with the joint venture. In
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., the heirs of Alexander
B. Hamilton granted oil and gas leases to Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc.
(“Hawkins”) covering certain areas in “Section 6” that had been owned by
Hamilton.159 Later, Hawkins entered a joint operating agreement with
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. (“Texas”). Texas also held leases covering land in
Section 6, and it became Operator. Later, Texas discovered that the
Hamilton heirs did not own the minerals in the land covered by the lease
they had granted to Hawkins. Instead, Hamilton’s widow owned the
minerals. Without telling Hawkins that its lessors lacked title to the
minerals purportedly leased to Hawkins, Texas acquired leases from the
heirs of Hamilton’s widow.
After discovering what Texas had done, Hawkins filed suit in
Arkansas asserting that the parties’ joint operating agreement created a
157. Breckenridge Co. v. Swales Management Corp., 522 P.2d 737, 739 (Colo.
1974).
158. Under North Dakota law, four elements must be present to form a joint
venture, namely “(1) contribution by the parties of money, property, time, or skill
in some common undertaking, but the contributions need not be equal or of the
same nature; (2) a proprietary interest and right of mutual control over the engaged
property; (3) an express or implied agreement for the sharing of profits, and
usually, but not necessarily, of losses; and (4) an express or implied contract
showing a joint venture was formed.” SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 718 N.S.2d
580, 583 (N.D. 2006).
In New Mexico, a joint adventure is formed when parties enter an agreement that
they will (1) combine their resources into a particular business deal, (2) share
profits, (3) share losses, and (4) have the mutual right of control over the subject
matter of the enterprise. Fullerton v. Kaune, 382 P.2d 529, 532 (N.M. 1963).
One treatise states that most authorities would agree on four elements that are
necessary to create a joint venture: (1) an agreement, express or inferred; (2) a
joint interest (contribution); (3) a sharing of profits and usually of losses, with
unlimited liability; and (4) a mutual right of control. See Henn, supra note 137 §
49 at p. 17.
159. 668 S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1984).
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joint venture, that joint venturers owe fiduciary duties to one another, and
that Texas had breached its duty when it purchased for itself alone an
interest in the subject matter of the joint venture. Accordingly, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that Hawkins was entitled to a one-half
interest in the leases Texas acquired from the widow’s heirs.160
2. Model Form Efforts to Avoid Partnership, Mining Partnership, or
Joint Venture
Parties typically want their joint operating agreement to govern their
obligations with respect to one another. They wish to avoid having the law
impose the sort of heightened standards of conduct associated with
partnerships, fiduciary relationships, and principal-agent relationships.
Similarly, they do not want to be directly liable to third persons for the acts
of other parties to the joint operating agreement, and the existence of a
partnership could result in direct liability to third persons.
Accordingly, the 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610
expressly disclaim any intent to create a partnership, mining partnership,
or joint venture.161 The 1982 and 1977 Forms expressly disclaim any intent
to create a “mining or other partnership or association.”162 The 1982 and
1977 Forms do not expressly refer to joint ventures, but the Forms’
disclaimer should be interpreted as effectively disclaiming any intent to
create a joint venture given the fact that a joint venture is essentially a
partnership for a limited purpose (as noted above), and given those Forms’
disclaimer of an intent to create a partnership or other “association.” The
AAPL Offshore Forms contain similar provisions, as does Rocky
Mountain Form 3, which similarly disclaims any intent to form a
partnership, mining partnership, or joint venture.163
Model forms used outside the United States contain similar
provisions. The 2012 AIPN Form states that the parties’ relationship is
“contractual only and shall not be construed as creating a partnership or
other recognized association.”164 AMPLA disclaims any intent to create a
partnership,165 and the CAPL Form states that the parties are not creating
a “partnership or association of any kind,” and instead hold their interests
as “tenants in common, subject to those modifications expressly provided
under this Agreement,” and that they are not intending to create
160.
161.
162.
163.
16.1.
164.
165.

Id.
2015 AAPL 610 art. VII.A; 1989 AAPL 610 art. VII.A.
1982 AAPL 610 art. VII.A; 1977 AAPL 610 art. VII.A.
AAPL 710 art. 19.1; AAPL 810 art. 22.1; Rocky Mountain Form 3 art.
2012 AIPN art. 9.3.B.8.
AMPLA cl. 3.3(f).
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partnership duties or fiduciary duties, except for duties relating to
commingling of funds and maintaining confidential information.166 The
UKCS Form states that the parties are not creating “any mining
partnership, commercial partnership or other partnership.”167
Under the law of some jurisdictions, a disclaimer of any intent to
create a particular relationship may not be sufficient to avoid creating such
a relationship if the facts and circumstances satisfy the elements needed to
create such a relationship,168 but the parties’ express disclaimer should be
given some weight, particularly with respect to their rights and duties visà-vis one another. Further, as discussed in more detail in the section of this
Article that discusses the relationship of the Operator to the NonOperators, the AAPL Forms vest in the Operator the right and duty to
conduct all operations, and provide that the Operator is not subject to the
direction or control of the Non-Operators. In most cases, the NonOperators’ lack of the right to control operations likely will prevent the
creation of a partnership, mining partnership, or joint venture.169
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF OPERATOR TO NON-OPERATORS
As already noted, joint operating agreements typically attempt to
avoid the creation of a partnership or joint venture between the parties.
Many joint operating agreements also attempt to control the legal nature
of the relationship between the Operator and the Non-Operators. The
agreements do so in two major ways. First, they attempt to ensure that the
Operator will be classified as an independent contractor, rather than as an
agent of the parties. Second, they seek to ensure that the Operator serves
on a no-gain and no-loss basis.
A. Independent Contractor Status and Avoiding Principal-Agency
Relationship
Most operating agreements used in North America attempt to classify
the Operator as an independent contractor, rather than as an agent of the
Non-Operators. Some other operating agreements characterize the
Operator as the agent of the Non-Operators.
166. CAPL cl. 1.05(A).
167. UKCS cl. 22.2.1.
168. This is certainly true in the United States. See infra note 177. Further, it
may be true outside the U.S. as well. CAPL cl. 1.05 states that “the Parties
recognize [their contractual clause disclaiming any partnership, trust relationship,
or fiduciary relationship] might not prevent such a trust, trust duty or fiduciary
relationship being imposed at law or in equity.”
169. See, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. United National Ins. Co., 481
F.Supp. 2d 567, 574 (E.D. La. 2007).
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1. The North American Forms—AAPL and CAPL
Most of the operating agreements used in North America contain
provisions that attempt to ensure that the Operator will be classified as an
independent contractor of the Non-Operators, not an agent of the NonOperators, for purposes of the work that the Operator performs. Avoiding
a principal-agency relationship serves two purposes. First, it helps protect
the Non-Operators from direct liability to third persons for the contracts
and torts of the Operator. As a general rule, a principal is liable to third
persons for the torts committed170 and the contracts entered by171 an agent
within the scope of his agency, but a person generally is not liable to third
persons for the acts of an independent contractor, provided that the person
has not maintained direction and control over the contractor’s work.172
Second, avoiding a principal-agency relationship can help ensure that
the Operator’s obligations are generally governed by the terms of the
operating agreement, rather than by rules that might be imposed as a matter
of law if the Operator were considered an agent. For example, an agent
generally owes a fiduciary duty to its principal.173 A fiduciary duty generally
has “[a] duty to act for someone else’s benefit, while subordinating one’s
personal interest to that of the other person,” and such a high level of duty
is generally not consistent with the intent of the parties to a joint operating
agreement.174 In contrast to an agent, an independent contractor generally
does not owe fiduciary duties.175
There are at least three ways in which a joint operating agreement can
seek to have an Operator classified as an independent contractor of the
Non-Operators, rather than as an agent. Namely, the agreement can: (1)
expressly characterize the Operator as an “independent contractor”; (2)
expressly disclaim the existence of a principal-agent relation; and (3) give
the Operator a degree of control over operations that is characteristic of an
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.04; Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Castegnaro, 772 A.2d 456, 460 (Pa. 2001); Marron v. Helmecke, 67 P.2d 1034,
1035 (Colo. 1937).
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 6.01-6.03.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 409, 414; Fleck v. ANG Coal
Gasification Co. 522 N.W.2d 445, 447 (N.D. 1994).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 13 (“An agent is a fiduciary with
respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
AGENCY § 8.01 (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's
benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”); Johnson v. Brewer
& Pritchard. P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002); Basile v. H & R Block, Inc. 761
A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000); Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., 590 N.W.2d 433, 437 (N.D. 1999).
174. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th edition 1990).
175. Horwitz v. Holabair & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 285-6 (Ill. 2004).
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independent contractor, rather than an agent. The two most recent versions
of the AAPL Form 610 do each of these three things.
First, Articles V.A of the 2015 and 1989 Forms state, “In its
performance of services hereunder for the Non-Operators, Operator shall
be an independent contractor ” Readers should note, however, that
merely declaring in an agreement that one party is an independent
contractor, rather than an agent, will not necessarily be determinative of
the nature of the parties’ relationship. Courts sometimes will consider the
parties’ intent regarding the nature of their relationship,176 but courts often
will look to the substantive terms of a contract’s terms to determine whether
those terms satisfy the elements of a principal-agency relationship, rather
than simply accepting the characterization that the parties choose to
adopt.177
Further, the same sentence expressly characterizing the Operator as an
independent contractor also gives the Operator a degree of control that is
characteristic of an independent contractor. The full sentence reads: “In its
performance of services hereunder for the Non-Operators, Operator shall
be an independent contractor not subject to the control or direction of the
Non-Operators except as to the type of operation to be undertaken in
accordance with the election procedures contained in this agreement.” The
major distinction between an independent contractor and an agent is that
176. For example, in In re Great Western Drilling, Ltd., 211 S.W.3d 828, 841
(Tex. App. – Eastland 2006), the court stated: “The JOAs gave Great Western full
control of all operations in the contract area and recognized that it was an
independent contractor not subject to the control or direction of the working
interest owners.” Thus, the court seemed to give some weight to the parties’
characterization of the relationship. This may contrast with Burlington Resources,
Inc. v. United National Ins. Co, 481 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 (E.D. La. 2007). In
Burlington Resources, the court quoted language stating: Operator “shall conduct
and direct and have full control of all operations on the Contract Area as
permitted and required by, and within the limits of this agreement. In its
performance of services hereunder for the Non-Operators [Burlington], Operator
shall be an independent contractor not subject to the control or direction of the
Non-Operators except as to the type of operation to be undertaken
” (emphasis
in original). Thus, the court deliberately chose to emphasize the provisions
relating to direction and control, while not emphasizing the parties’
characterization of their relationship.
177. One oil and gas professor said: “[I]t is not possible to make what is in fact
a ‘cat’ into a ‘dog’ by merely labeling it a ‘dog.’ If the factual attributes point
towards ‘cat,’ we have a ‘cat,’ not a ‘dog.’” David E. Pierce, Evolution of Joint
Operations in the oil and Gas Industry, RCKY. MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. *2-19
Special Inst. On Joint Operation and the New AAPL Form 610-2015 Model Form
Operating Agreement (2017); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 1.01
(“An agency relationship arises only when the elements stated in § 1.01 are
present. Whether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement
between parties or in the context of industry or popular usage is not controlling.”)
& § 101 cmt. (c).
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an agent is subject to the principal’s direction and control, whereas an
independent contractor generally is not.178
The next sentence of Article V.A goes on to state that the “Operator
shall not be deemed, or hold itself out as, the agent of the Non-Operators
with authority to bind them to any obligation or liability assumed or
incurred by Operator to any third party.”179 The Offshore AAPL Forms
and CAPL Form contain similar provisions.180
The older versions of the AAPL Form 610 do not expressly refer to
the Operator as an independent contractor, but those forms provide that
the Operator will “conduct and direct and have full control of all
operations.”181 Such freedom from direction and control by a principal is
characteristic of an independent contractor. The two AAPL Forms
designed to be offshore operating agreements expressly provide that the
Operator is an “independent contractor, not subject to the control or
direction of Non-Operating Parties.”182 The CAPL Form, which often is
used in Canada, also characterizes the Operator as an independent
contractor.183
As a general rule, parties to joint operating agreements seem to be
successful in avoiding having the Operator classified as an agent of the
non-operators.184 Indeed, there seem to be relatively few cases in which
178. Enterprise Mgt. Consultants, Inc. v. State, 768 P.2d 359, 362 n.13
(Okla. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 1. Of course, the person who
hires anindependent contractor does choose the job that will be done.
179. Article V.A. The 1989 Agreement has language identical to that quoted
above. However, in the 2015 Form, Article V.A. goes on to provide a narrow
exception to this rule. Namely, the Non-Operators appoint the Operator as their
agent for purposes of executing or filing documents relating to pooling or
unitization. This exception is not listed in the 1989 Form.
See also AAPL 710 art. 5.1; AAPL 810 art. 5.1 (“The Operator is not the agent or
fiduciary of the Non-Operator Parties.”); CAPL cl. 1.05(A) (excluding both
agency relationships between parties and existence of fiduciary duties, except for
limited purposes).
180. AAPL 710 art. 5.1 (“No Party shall be deemed to be, or hold itsef out as,
the agent or fiduciary of another Party.”); AAPL 810 art. 5.1 (“The Operator is
not the agent or fiduciary of the Non-Operator Parties.”); CAPL cl. 1.05(A)
(excluding both agency relationships between parties and existence of fiduciary
duties, except for limited purposes).
181. AAPL-610 (1982) art. V.A; AAPL-610 (1977) art. V.A; AAPL-610
(1956) art. 5.
182. AAPL 710 (2002) art. 5.1; AAPL 810 (2007) art. 5.1 (“Operator is an
independent contractor, not subject to the control or direction of Non-Operating
Parties.”).
183. CAPL cl. 3.03.
184. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on
April 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 963 (E.D. La. 2011); In re Great Western
Drilling, Ltd., 211 S.W.3d 828, 841 (Tex. App. Eastland 2006); Burlington Resources,
Inc. v. United National Ins. Co, 481 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 (E.D. La. 2007).
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someone argues that, because the Operator conducts all operations, the
Operator is an agent of the parties to the joint operating agreement.
Sometimes a third person argues that the non-operators are directly liable
for torts or contracts of the Operator, but such arguments are typically
based on an assertion that the joint operating agreement creates a joint
venture, rather than on an assertion the Operator is an agent because it
conducts all operations. Further, non-operators sometimes argue that the
Operator owes them fiduciary duties or heightened duties of loyalty, but
often such arguments are based on an assertion that the joint operating
agreement creates a joint venture or that the Operator is an agent for some
limited purpose, such as selling a non-operator’s share of production,
rather than on an assertion that an Operator is a third party for all purposes.
2. Forms Used Outside North America
In contrast to the approach taken by most forms used in North
America, the AMPLA Form refers to the Operator as being the “agent of
the [Non-Operators] for purposes of this agreement.”185 The UKCS Form
provides that the Operator will serve as the agent of the other parties in
dealing with contractors.186 In contrast, however, AIPN Form 2012 states
that the agreement “shall not be deemed or construed to authorize any
Party to act as an agent . . . for any other Party for any purpose whatsoever
except as explicitly set forth in this Agreement,” and that “the Parties shall
not be considered fiduciaries except as expressly provided.”187
B. Agency Status for Limited Purposes Under Certain Model Forms
Even model forms that disclaim the existence of an agency
relationship or fiduciary relationship in general may create such a
relationship for limited purposes. For example, as noted earlier this
Article, the 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 expressly designates the
Operator as an agent for the limited purpose of executing, filing, and
recording certain instruments relating to communitization or unitization.188
In addition, as previously noted, various versions of Form 610 recognize
that the Operator has a duty to serve as custody of funds that Non185. AMPLA cl. 6.1; see also AMPLA cl. 7.1(a) (Operator is required to
exercise its powers “as agent for and on behalf of” the Non-Operators.
186.
UKCS cl. 6.5.8.
187. 2012 AIPN art. 14.1.
188. “Unitization” refers to “the joint operation of all or some portion of a
producing reservoir,” see Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, MANUAL OF
OIL AND GAS TERMS. The joint operation may come about by agreement or by
order of an oil and gas regulator.” Communitization” refers to the same concept,
but “communitization” often is used when federal lands are involved.
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Operators advance to the Operator, and that the Operator may have
fiduciary duties with respect to those funds.189
Further, an agency relationship might be created if an Operator
exercises its rights under a clause relating to the sale of product. The
general rule under joint operating agreements is that each party has an
obligation to take its share of production in kind and to arrange its sale or
other disposition.190 The AAPL Forms generally provide, however, that if
a Non-Operator fails to take its share or production in kind or to make its
own arrangements to sell the product, the Operator has the right, though
not the duty, to sell the product for the account of that Non-Operator.191
Some courts have concluded that, if the Operator sells products on behalf
of a non-operator, then, in doing so, it serves as an agent of that nonoperator.192
C. Serving on a No-Gain, No-Loss Basis
The worldwide consensus view is that the Operator generally should
neither gain a profit nor incur a loss because of its role as Operator.193 For
189. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4.
190. 2015 AAPL 610 art. VI.G; 1989 AAPL 610 art. VI.G; 1982 AAPL art.
VI.C; AAPL 710 art. 22.2; AAPL 810 art. 15.1; 2012 AIPN art. 9.1; AMPLA cl.
4.3(a)(iii); CAPL cl. 6.01(A); UKCS cl. 18(b).
191. See, e.g., 2015 AAPL 610 art. VI.H; 1989 AAPL art. VI.G; 1982 AAPL
art. VI.C; 1977 AAPL art. VI.C; AAPL 710 art. 22.3; AAPL 810 art. 15.3.
192. Atl. Richfield Co. v. The Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.
Texarkana 1993).
193. This is made explicit in some international JOA forms. Article 4.2.B.5 of
the AIPN 2012 Form provides that, subject to exceptions provided in the JOA’s
accounting procedures or provisions for potential operator liability in the event of
gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Operator should “neither gain a profit
nor suffer a loss as a result of being the Operator.”
AMPLA cl. 6.3(a) provides that the Operator may charge the parties for certain
“Operator Overhead” as specified by the parties in a Schedule 1, but Schedule 1
states that this amount is designed to “reimburse without profit” the overhead
expenses of the Operator. Further, clause 6.3(c) of the AMPLA Form states: “It is
intended that the Operator will neither gain nor, except where it has committed
fraud or willful misconduct, suffer a loss as a result of acting as Operator in the
conduct of Joint Operations.”
Similarly, clause 6.2.2(d) of the UKCS Form states that, except in the case of
willful misconduct, the Operator should “neither gain nor suffer a loss in such
capacity as a result of acting as Operator in the conduct of Joint Operations.”
The no gain/no loss principle is not explicitly stated in the joint operating
agreement forms commonly used in the U.S., but the AAPL forms implicitly
incorporate this principle by providing that the parties to the JOA will generally
share revenue and costs in proportion to their ownership fraction in the venture,
the provisions in the AAPL forms that protect the Non-Operators against any selfdealing by the Operator, and provisions in the accounting rules commonly used
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this reason, the Operator is not compensated for its service as Operator. It
is only entitled to reimbursement of its expenses, which may include a
reasonable overhead, but otherwise it works “gratuitously for the benefit
of all members of the JOA.”194 Further, certain provisions in the joint
operating agreement that are designed to ensure that the Operator secures
goods and services at a reasonable cost (these are discussed in Section
II(B)(1) of this Article) include extra safeguards that apply if the Operator
wishes to use its own materials and charge the joint account, or if it wishes
to purchase services or materials from an affiliate. These measures seek to
ensure that the Operator does not make money based on its service as
Operator. This helps ensure that parties do not overpay for goods and
services.
In addition, these measures help ensure that the Operator will make
decisions based on what is best to ensure profitability of operations for all
owners. If the Operator were allowed to make a profit on its work as
Operator, there might be a conflict of interest between what is best for the
parties as owners and what would produce the most profit for the
Operator’s work.
The corollary of the no-gain concept is the no-loss concept. The
Operator should be entitled to reimbursement for its costs, including a
reasonable reimbursement for overhead. Further, as between the parties,
the Operator should be protected from losses and liabilities arising from
the Operator’s work as Operator. The AAPL joint operating agreement
Forms typically provide such protection by providing a general rule that
parties bear costs in proportion to their ownership interest, and that the
parties’ liabilities are several, not joint or collective.195 In addition, the
AAPL Forms each contain exculpatory clauses which provide that the
Operator, in its role “as Operator,” generally will not be liable to the other
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred.196 Forms used outside
the United States also tend to contain exculpatory clauses.197

by JOA parties in the U.S., which allow the Operator to charge for overhead, but
only to a defined extent. See 2005 COPAS Accounting Procedure, Section III.
194. Scott C. Styles, Joint Operating Agreements 375, found in OIL AND GAS
LAW—CURRENT PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2011).
195. See, e.g., art. VII.A in the 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions of AAPL
Form 610. See also AAPL 710 arts. 8.1 and 19.1; AAPL 810 arts. 6.1 and 22.1.
196. The exculpatory clause is contained in art. V.A of the 2015, 1989, 1982,
and 1977 versions of the AAPL Form 610, and in art. 5 of the 1956 Form. It is
contained in art. 5.2 in both the AAPL Form 710 (2002) and the AAPL Form 810
(2007).
197. See, e.g., AIPN art. 4.6; see also CAPL cl. 4.01 and 4.02; UKCS cl. 6.2.4;
AMPLA cl. 6.5.
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As a general rule, the exculpatory protection provided to the Operator
is not absolute. Common exceptions include liability relating to losses
sustained or liability incurred when the loss or liability arises from gross
negligence, willful misconduct, or a breach of specific terms of the joint
operating agreement.
D. Exculpatory Clauses
Joint operating agreements establish a general rule that each party
bears a share of the expenses that arise from operations, with each party’s
share being in proportion to their ownership interest.198 That expensesharing scheme would be disrupted if a party to the agreement was liable
to the other parties for some loss or expense arising from joint operations.
The scheme also would be disrupted if one party incurred direct liability
to third persons for some expense or loss arising from joint operations, and
the other parties did not share direct liability, and they were excused, as
between the parties, from paying their proportionate share of that expense.
Because the Operator is the party that performs almost all activities
necessary for joint operations, it is the Operator that has the greatest risk
of incurring additional liability.
To help preserve the general rule of proportionate liability, most joint
operating agreements contain an “exculpatory clause” that protects the
Operator from liability “as Operator” to the Non-Operators for either
losses sustained by the parties or liabilities incurred to third persons in
connection with joint operations. This exculpatory protection has three
notable limitations. First, although the exculpatory clause protects the
Operator from liability as between the parties for liabilities incurred to
third persons, the exculpatory clause of course does not affect the
Operator’s direct liability to third persons. Second, although the
exculpatory clause protects the Operator from liability as Operator, the
Operator still bears its proportionate share of liability in its role as one of
the parties to the operating agreement.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, exculpatory clauses typically
do not give the Operator unconditional protection. For example,
exculpatory clauses typically do not protect the Operator from liability
arising from the Operator’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.
The fact that the exculpatory clause does not provide unconditional
protection creates the potential for disputes between the Operator and
Non-Operators. One type of conflict involves factual disputes regarding
whether particular action or inaction constituted gross negligence or
198. See, for example, art. VII.A of the 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions
of the AAPL Form 610.
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willful misconduct. But an issue that recently attracted more attention is
whether the exculpatory clause’s protections apply to liabilities arising
from activities that are not part of operations and to liabilities arising from
the Operator’s alleged breach of some express duty.199 Different courts
have reached different conclusions. The different conclusions have come
about partly because different exculpatory clauses have different wording,
but sometimes different courts have reached different conclusions even
when considering the same language.
1. Model Forms Used in the U.S.
The language of the exculpatory clause in the AAPL Form 610 has
changed multiple times. In the 1956 version, the exculpatory clause was
part of the same sentence that established a standard of care. The sentence
provided: “[The Operator] shall conduct all such operations in a good and
workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liability as Operator to the other
parties for losses sustained, or liabilities incurred, except such as may
result from gross negligence or from breach of the provisions of this
agreement.”200 This clearly seems to create two exceptions to the
protection provided by the exculpatory clauses—one for liabilities arising
from gross negligence and a second for liabilities arising from a breach of
the operating agreement.201
When the 1977 version of the AAPL Model 610 was drafted, the
exculpatory clause was again included in the same sentence that
established a standard of conduct. But the 1977 exculpatory clause
contains language different than that in the 1956 Form. In the 1977 Form,
the relevant sentence provides: “[The Operator] shall conduct all such
operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liability
as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred,
except such as may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct.”202
The revision eliminated the express reference to an exception to the
Operator’s exculpation from liability for “a breach of the operating
agreement,” but it added a “willful misconduct” exception. The
exculpatory clause remained the same in the 1982 version of the Form 610.

199. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Hunter & Cheryl M. Kornick, Operator Liability in
the 21st Century: Is Being in Charge Still Worth It?, 51 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
15-1 (2005).
200. 1956 AAPL 610 art. 5.
201. Ernest E. Smith & John S. Lowe, The Operator: Liability to NonOperators, Resignation, Removal and Selection of a Successor, ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. FOUND. 2 (2008).
202. 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
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The 1977 and 1982 exculpatory clauses could be interpreted as
expanding the Operator’s protection by eliminating the exception for
breach of the agreement. Under such an interpretation, the Operator could
still be held liable as Operator for a breach of the agreement if the breach
also constituted an example of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Such an interpretation received some support in commentary. For
example, Professor Ernest E. Smith concluded, “[t]he history of the
language used in the model form suggests that” the 1977 and 1982
exculpatory clauses protect the Operator even against liability for breaches
of specific clauses of the joint operating agreement, provided that the
breaches do not rise to the level of gross negligence or willful
misconduct.203
This interpretation also received some support in case law. The
leading case following this view is Stine v. Marathon Oil Co.,204 a diversity
case from Texas. In Stine, the non-operator asserted that the Operator
breached specific provisions of the parties’ joint operating agreement by
plugging and abandoning two wells without first informing the nonoperator and giving him a chance to take over the wells, and also by failing
to deliver certain information to the non-operators. The jury returned a
verdict for the non-operator and the trial court entered a money judgment
based on the verdict. The Operator appealed, arguing that it was protected
by the exculpatory clause in the parties’ agreement, which used the same
language as is found in the exculpatory clauses found in the 1977 and 1982
Forms. The United States Fifth Circuit agreed with the Operator and
reversed (in part). The Fifth Circuit held that the exculpatory language
used in the 1977 and 1982 AAPL Form 610 agreements protects the
Operator from liability, absent gross negligence or willful misconduct, for
any action that the Operator takes in the capacity as Operator, even if the
action constitutes a breach of the agreement.205
Alternatively, someone could argue—particularly that the 1977 and
1982 exculpatory clauses appear in the same sentence as a clause
establishing a standard of conduct for “operations”—that the clauses have
no application for liabilities arising from the Operator’s breach of
particular duties that are expressly imposed by the agreement, particularly
if the duties are not part of “operations.” This view also received some
203. Ernest E. Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to
Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
12-30 (1986). For an interesting discussion of the meaning of “gross negligence”
and “willful misconduct,” with a focus on the context of the use of those terms in
the Oil Pollution Act, see Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of
“Gross Negligence or Willful Misconduct,” 71 LA. L. REV. 957 (2011).
204. 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992).
205. Stine, 976 F.2d at 261.
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support in commentary, as well as in the courts.206 For example, in contrast
to Stine’s Erie-guess that Texas law would apply the 1977 and 1982
exculpatory clause to all conduct by the Operator even if it involved breach
of an express provision of the joint operating agreement, some Texas state
appellate courts concluded that the clause would not apply to such
breaches.207
Similarly, the United States Tenth Circuit concluded that exculpatory
clauses based on the 1977 and 1982 language would not apply to breaches
of express clauses of the agreement. In Shell v. Rocky Mountain
Production, LLC v. v. Ultra Resources, Inc., a non-operator claimed that
the Operator breached the operating agreement’s clauses regarding
obtaining competitive prices for drilling.208 The Operator argued that the
exculpatory clause applied and that the non-operator could not recover
unless it proved that the Operator had engaged in gross negligence or
willful misconduct. The United States Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding
that the clause did not protect the Operator against liability for breaches of
duties expressly imposed by the joint operating agreement.209 Thus, Ultra
Resources and Stine reached opposing views on the scope of the 1977 and
1982 exculpatory clauses.
The exculpatory clause was changed in the 1989 version of the AAPL
Form 610. Like the prior Forms, the 1989 Form included both the
exculpatory clause and the clause that establishes a standard of conduct in
a single sentence. In the 1989 Form, however, both of those clauses have
different language than in earlier drafts of the Form. In the 1989 Form, the
sentence reads:
Operator shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a
reasonable prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner,
with due diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield
practice, and in compliance with applicable law and regulation,
but in no event shall it have any liability as Operator to the other
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as
may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct.
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the scope of the 1989 protection in
Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC.210 In that case, non-operators
206. Gary Conine, The Prudent Operator Standard: Applications Beyond the
Oil and Gas Lease, 41 NATURAL RES. J. 23 (2001).
207. See, e.g., Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267,
283 (Tex. App. Tyler 2003); Abraxus Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d
741 (Tex. App. El Paso 2000).
208. 415 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
209. Id.
210. 395 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2013).
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asserted that the Operator committed various breaches of the joint
operating agreement. The Texas Supreme Court opened its discussion of
the issues by stating that it needed to decide “whether the exculpatory
clause in the JOA sets the standard to adjudicate the breach of contract
claims against [the Operator].”211 Ultimately, the court decided that the
1989 clause would apply. The court noted that the sentence containing the
exculpatory clause had been changed to provide that the Operator must
conduct its “activities” as a reasonably prudent operator, whereas the 1982
and 1977 versions of the clause had applied to operations. Thus, the
change seemed to broaden the prudent operator standard from just
operational activities to all activities. The court reasoned that the change
in language similarly had the effect of expanding the scope of liability
protection from operational activities to all activities.212 Thus, Reeder gave
a broad interpretation of the 1989 exculpatory language, concluding that it
provides protection for all activities of the Operator, unless the conduct
involves gross negligence or willful misconduct.213 The scope of the 1982
and 1977 exculpatory clauses was not before the court, and it did not opine
on the scope of those clauses, but the court’s emphasis on the significance
of the change in language from “operations” to “activities” could be read
as implying that the 1982 and 1977 language might not apply to breaches
of duties expressly imposed by the joint operating agreement.
The language of the exculpatory clause was revised again in the 2015
version of the AAPL Form 610. The revision seems to be a response to
Reeder. Like the 1989 Form, the 2015 Form uses broad language when it
imposes a standard of conduct—applying the standard to all of the
Operator’s “activities,” not just to operations. But the portion of the
language that contains the exculpatory language now refers only to
operations. In particular, the language reads:
Operator shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a
reasonably prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner,
with due diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield
practice, and in compliance with applicable law and regulation.
However, in no event shall it have any liability as Operator to the
other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred in
connection with authorized or approved operations under this
agreement except such as may result from gross negligence or
willful misconduct.214
211.
212.
213.
214.

Reeder, 395 S.W.3d at 792.
Id.
Id. at 795.
2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
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There is still potential for a court to interpret the exculpatory clause
broadly. The new language does not go back to the 1956 language, which
expressly put liabilities arising from a breach of the agreement outside the
scope of the exculpatory clause. Further, a court could interpret “in
connection with” broadly. But given the history of the changes to the
clause and the cases interpreting the exculpatory clause, it seems likely
that a court will conclude that the 2015 exculpatory clause has a narrower
scope than that of the 1989 clause as it is interpreted in Reeder.
AAPL Form 710 states in capital letters, “OPERATOR SHALL NOT
BE LIABLE TO NON-OPERATORS FOR LOSSES SUSTAINED OR
LIABILITIES INCURRED, EXCEPT AS MAY RESULT FROM
OPERATOR’S GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL
MISCONDUCT.”215 This sentence does not expressly restrict application
of the exculpatory clause to any particular sort of activity. Thus, the
exculpation clause arguably applies to any sort of activity, even
administrative tasks, and it arguably applies even if the Operator’s action
or inaction constitutes a breach of the agreement. On the other hand, the
clause appears in the middle of a section that deals with operations and the
standard of care for such operations. Accordingly, someone could
plausibly argue that the clause applies only with respect to operational
activities and that it protects the Operator against liability for an alleged
breach of a standard of care (so long as the breach does not arise to the
level of gross negligence), but not against liability for breach of an express
and specific contractual requirement.
AAPL offshore Form 810 contains language almost identical to that
which is used in Form 710. Further, like the exculpatory clause in Form
710, the exculpatory clause in Form 810 is written in all capital letters, and
it appears in the middle of a paragraph that imposes a standard of care for
the conduct of operations. RMMLF Form 3 also gives the Operator broad
protection—perhaps broader than the AAPL Forms—by stating that the
“Operator shall not be liable to any other Party for losses sustained in the

215. AAPL 710 art. 5. As between the parties to the operating agreement, this
clause is designed to protect the Operator from losses or liabilities arising from
the Operator’s own negligence, as long as the negligence does not rise to the level
of gross negligence. Under the laws of some states, an indemnity clause that
protects the indemnitee from liability for its own negligence must be conspicuous
(the clause may also need to either expressly state that it applies even if the
indemnitee was negligent or be clear and unambiguous in its application). All
capital letters may help the clause satisfy the requirement of being conspicuous.
State law would apply in state waters. Also, on the federal Outer Continental
Shelf, the contract law of the nearest state typically is borrowed as surrogate
federal law to govern disputes.
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conduct of its operations hereunder, except such losses as may result from
Operator’s bad faith.”216
2. Forms Used Outside the U.S.
Model form operating agreements used outside the United States also
contain exculpatory clauses that protect the Operator, some of which
provide even broader protection to the operator than the forms most
commonly used in the U.S.
The Australian and Canadian forms contain exculpatory clauses that
are similar in scope to the exculpatory clauses in most of the AAPL Forms.
AMPLA section 6.5 provides that “the Operator is not liable to the [NonOperators] for any loss sustained or liability incurred in connection with
the” joint operations, unless the Operator or a person for whom the
Operator is vicariously liable “has committed fraud or Wilful
Misconduct.”217 AMPLA section 6.6 requires each Non-Operator to
indemnify the Operator for the Non-Operator’s proportionate share of
losses or liabilities not caused by such fraud or Wilful Misconduct, and
section 6.7 requires the Operator to indemnify the other parties for losses
or liabilities that are caused by such fraud or Wilful Misconduct. The
CAPL Form is somewhat similar.218
The UKCS Form, though, contains an exculpatory clause that may
give the Operator even broader protection. The UKCS Form provides that
the parties’ obligation to indemnify the Operator in proportion to their
respective ownership shares applies to all liabilities arising from
operations, except those that arise from the Operator’s “Wilful
Misconduct.”219 The UKCS Form defines “Wilful Misconduct” in a
manner that probably encompasses both gross negligence and intentional
misconduct, but only by as meaning “an intentional or reckless disregard
by Senior Managerial Personnel of Good Oilfield Practice or any of the
terms of this Agreement.”220 Curiously, the UKCS Form does not define
“Senior Managerial Personnel,” but (in what may be a drafting error) it
defines “Senior Supervisory Personnel” in part as meaning “any person
216. Rocky Mountain Form 3 art. 4.5.
217. AMPLA cl. 6.5.
218. As between the parties, CAPL generally limits the Operator’s liability as
Operator to circumstances in which losses or liabilities arise from “Gross
Negligence or Wilful Misconduct of the Operator, its Affiliates or their respective
directors, officers, employees, agents or contractors.” CAPL cl. 4.02. Barring such
circumstances, the parties agree to bear liabilities arising from operations in
proportion to their ownership share and to indemnify the Operator against liability
exceeding its ownership share. CAPL cl. 4.01.
219. UKCS cl. 22.2.2.
220. UKCS cl. 1.1 (emphasis added).
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employed by a Party as a director or other corporate officer or who
occupies a senior managerial position in such Party with direct
responsibility for the conduct of operations.”
The 2012 AIPN Form contains multiple options for the language of
the exculpatory clause, and the parties will need to choose which option
they prefer. The main option provides some of the broadest protection
found in any model form. This exculpatory clause provides the Operator
with protection against virtually all liabilities, even against liabilities
arising from its gross negligence or willful misconduct;221 but the Form
also contains an optional clause that can negate the exculpatory clause in
whole or part for liabilities that arise from the gross negligence or willful
misconduct of “Senior Supervisory Personnel.”222 If that option is chosen,
the level of protection provided to the Operator will still be broader than
that provided by most model forms, and will be similar to that provided by
the UKCS Form.
V. RESIGNATIONS OF THE OPERATOR AND AUTOMATIC TERMINATIONS
Most joint operating agreement forms contain provisions recognizing
that an Operator may resign, and some forms also specify circumstances
that will result in a “deemed resignation” or an automatic termination of a
party’s status as Operator. The first subsection below discusses the way
that model form joint operating agreements govern express resignations
by the Operator, and the next subsection discusses provisions that provide
for “deemed resignations” or automatic termination of a party’s status as
Operator when particular circumstances arise.
A. Express Resignations
All of the commonly-used JOA forms expressly allow the Operator to
resign, though each requires that the Operator give appropriate notice and
specifies some minimum time between the notice of resignation and the
effective date of the resignation. The delay in the effective date of the
resignation is designed to give the parties adequate time to select a new
Operator and for that Operator to prepare to assume the role of Operator.
For example, under the 2015 version of AAPL Form 610, the
“Operator may resign at any time by giving written notice thereof to NonOperators.”223 Similar provisions appear in each of the prior versions of
221. 2012 AIPN art. 4.6.A and 4.6.B.
222. 2012 AIPN art. 4.6.D.
223. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1.
The giving of notices, including notices of resignation, is governed by Article XII
under the 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms. Section 20 of the 1956 Form
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AAPL Form 610, as well as in the AAPL forms designed for use
offshore.224 The 2015 Form states that a resignation will be effective “on the
earlier of . . . [t]he time and date that a successor Operator has been selected .
. . and assumes the duties of Operator . . . or 7:00 o’clock A.M. on the first
day of the calendar month following the expiration of ninety (90) days after
the giving of notice of resignation.”225 This language slightly differs from the
language used in the prior AAPL forms, but the difference in language may
not bring about a substantive change in the effective date and time of
resignations. The 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms each provided that a
resignation generally would “not become effective until 7:00 o’clock A.M. on
the first day of the calendar month following the expiration of ninety (90) days
after the giving of notice of resignation . . . unless a successor Operator has
been selected and assumes the duties of Operator at an earlier date.”226
The CAPL Form allows the Operator to resign with just forty-five days’
notice227—a shorter notice period than mandated by the AAPL Forms—but
most joint operating agreements used outside the U.S. provide for a longer
delay between notice of resignation and the effective date of resignation.
The AIPN 2012 Model provides that, “Subject to Article 4.11, Operator may
resign as Operator by so notifying the other Parties at least one hundred and
twenty (120) Days before the effective date of such resignation.” Article
4.11.E of the AIPN Form further provides that a resignation is not effective
until any necessary government approvals are obtained. This provision is
included in recognition of the fact that many host governments prohibit a
change in Operator without government consent. The 2011 version of
AMPLA, an Australian form, provides that an Operator may resign, “having
governed the giving of notice. Article XII specifies what methods of delivery may
be used and the point in time when delivery is considered complete (typically,
“when received”). An Operator that wishes to resign should make sure that it uses
an authorized method of delivering its notice of resignation in order to avoid a
potential dispute regarding whether the resignation was effective.
224. The 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms each contained an Article V.B.1. that
included a sentence identical in language that found in the 2015 Form—“Operator
may resign at any time by giving written notice thereof to Non-Operators.”
Section 20 of the 1956 Form contained a provision that was identical in substance:
“Operator may resign from its duties and obligations as Operator at any time upon
written notice of not less than ninety (90) days given to all other parties.” Article
4.3 of AAPL 810 generally allows the Operator to resign by giving written notice.
See also AAPL 710 art. 4.3.
225. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.7.
226. This provision is found in Article V.B.1. of the 1989, 1982, and 1977
Forms. Section 20 of the 1956 Form provided that the Operator could resign
“upon written notice of not less than ninety (90) days.” See also AAPL-710 (2002)
§ 4.6; AAPL-810 (2007) § 4.6.
Article 4.2 of Rocky Mountain Form 3 provides that the Operator may resign with
3 months’ notice.
227. CAPL cl. 2.04.
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given at least 180 days’ notice.”228 A form used on the United Kingdom
Continental Shelf provides that an Operator has the “right to resign . . . at
the end of any Month by giving not less than one hundred and eight (180)
days notice to the Participants or such shorter period of notice as” a
committee of the parties “may decide.”229
If the Operator ceases performance of its duties early, it may be liable
for breach of contract. In Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp., the parties were
using a joint operating agreement which provided: “Operator may resign
from its duties and obligations as Operator at any time upon written notice
of not less than ninety (90) days given to all other parties.”230 On March
16, 1977, a natural gas well blew out. On March 21, the Operator notified
the other parties that it was resigning. On March 25, just four days after
giving notice, the Operator threatened to plug and abandon the well unless
the other parties found a replacement Operator by 5:00 p.m. that day. One
of the parties—Lancaster—found a company that agreed to become
Operator on short notice, but only if Lancaster turned over a substantial
portion of a back-in interest that it owned. Lancaster agreed, perhaps
feeling that it had little choice. The well was brought under control and
recompleted, after which it produced in paying quantities, though it never
reached payout.
Lancaster brought suit against the former Operator for breach of the JOA
provision that required the Operator to give ninety days’ notice before its
resignation would be effective. The district court found that the Operator did
not breach the contract, but the Louisiana Third Circuit reversed, concluding
that it was “abundantly clear” that the Operator had breached the contract’s
ninety-day notice requirement.231 The court then awarded damages based on
the market value of the mineral interest that Lancaster relinquished in order to
entice a company to agree to become Operator on such short notice.232
Neither the 2015 Form nor the earlier AAPL Forms specify who
decides whether the successor Operator will assume the duties of Operator
prior to the date on which the outgoing Operator’s resignation would
otherwise be effective. Because the delay in effective date protects the
Non-Operators, it seems clear that the outgoing Operator should not have
the right to demand that the successor Operator assume the duties of
228. AMPLA cl. 6.2(b).
229. UKCS cl. 5.2.1.
230. Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp., 491 So. 2d 768, 776 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
1986). The quoted language is identical to that in the first sentence of Section 20
of the 1956 Form. Based on this and other quoted language, it appears that the
parties’ agreement was largely based on the 1956 Form, but that it contained
additional provisions.
231. Id. at 777.
232. Id. at 777-8.
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Operator “earlier.” Further, the parties other than the successor Operator
and outgoing Operator probably do not have a right to demand that the
successor assume responsibilities earlier. But if the successor Operator has
been selected and believes it is ready to assume its new duties earlier, does
the successor have a right to demand that the outgoing Operator relinquish
control earlier? Or, must the outgoing Operator, the other parties, or both,
concur? If the other parties must concur, is a majority sufficient?
B. Deemed Resignations and Automatic Terminations of Operator
Under the 2015 version of AAPL Form 610, the Operator will be
“deemed” to have resigned upon the occurrence of any one of three
different circumstances. This is governed by Article V.B.2, which states:
2. Events Deemed Resignation of Operator: If, after the effective
date of this agreement, Operator (i) terminates its legal existence,
(ii) sells, transfers or has a loss of title to more than % of its
interest in the Contrast Area as shown on Exhibit “A,” or (iii) is
no longer capable of serving as Operator, then Operator shall be
deemed to have resigned without any action by Non-Operators,
except for selection of a successor Operator. A change of a
corporate name or type of business entity of Operator shall not be
deemed resignation of Operator.
The 1989 and 1982 Forms also provided for “deemed” resignations upon
the occurrence of any one of three circumstances, but the 2015 version of
the deemed-resignation is different from the two prior versions. Like the
2015 Form, the 1989 and 1982 Forms provided that the Operator would
be deemed to have resigned if it terminates its legal existence or it becomes
incapable of serving as Operator. But otherwise, the 1989 and 1982 Forms
only provided for a deemed resignation in the event that the Operator no
longer owned an interest “hereunder in the Contract Area.” In contrast, as
shown by the quoted language above, the 2015 Form contemplates that the
parties may provide that the Operator is deemed to have resigned if it
reduces its ownership interest by a specified amount.
This change provides parties with more flexibility, which should be
welcome. If parties wish to avoid having an Operator that owns no
working interest whatsoever, they may wish to avoid having an Operator
that owns only a small interest. But parties who use the 2015 Form should
be careful to make sure they fill-in the blank contained in Article V.B.2. If
the parties fail to fill-in the blank, it is not clear how a court would interpret
that portion of Article V.B.2. For example, a court might treat the blank as
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a zero, or it might conclude that the “transfer-of-interest” portion of the
deemed-resignation clause will have no effect.
Further, parties should be careful to make sure, when they fill-in the
blank, that they all have the same understanding of the clause. At least two
potential bases for confusion exist. First, as written, the clause appears to
require the parties to specify the portion of the Operator’s interest that
must be transferred in order for there to be a deemed resignation, not the
minimum portion that must be retained in order to avoid a deemed
resignation.
Second, there could be confusion about what is meant by the
percentage specified when they fill-in the blank. The percentage specified
in Article V.B.2 refers to the percentage of the Operator’s interest, not the
percentage of the total that must be transferred in order to trigger a deemed
resignation. Thus, if the Operator starts with 40% of the total working
interest, and the parties wish for there to be a deemed resignation if the
Operator’s interest falls below 10% of the total working interest, the
parties should fill-in the blank with “75” (because it would require the
Operator transferring more than 30% of the total interest, which would
equal 75% of its own interest, in order to trigger a deemed resignation).
If parties use the 2015 Form, they may wish to alter the form to address
those potential bases of confusion. In addition, in the event that there is a
change in the Operator, the parties should consider whether they wish to
revise the Article V.B.2 percentage. Suppose, for instance, that the parties
choose a successor Operator that owns 20% of the total working interest
to replace an Operator that owned a 40% interest, but the parties still wish
for a deemed resignation to occur in the event that the Operator’s total
working interest falls below 10% of the total working interest. In that case,
the parties would need to amend Article V.B.2 to provide that there would
be a deemed resignation of the Operator if it transferred more than 50% of
its own interest. Otherwise, if the parties retain the language providing that
a deemed resignation will occur in event that the Operator transfers 75%
of its interest, the new Operator that starts with 20% of the total working
interest could drop to a 5% total interest before a deemed resignation
occurs.
A fourth potential change relates to the fact that Article V.B.2 refers
to a sale, transfer, or loss of title. The parties may wish to supplement
Article V.B.2 to provide for the possibility of a deemed resignation if the
Operator’s interest is reduced because of a failure of title under Article
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IV.B.1,233 as well a loss of title under Article IV.B.2,234 but not a loss under
Article IV.B.3. (A loss under Article IV.B.3 does not result in a
readjustment of ownership percentages under the JOA, which are reflected
on Exhibit “A.”).235
Other model forms also provide for various circumstances that will
result in an automatic termination. Such circumstances include the
Operator selling its entire ownership interest (or, under some agreements,
selling enough that its ownership share falls below a specified percentage
or below the percentage interest held by another party), and material
breaches of the agreement that are not corrected after notice and a
reasonable time to cure.236
C. Effect of Bankruptcy on Operator Status
The 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 provide that, if an
Operator becomes insolvent, bankrupt, or is placed in receivership, the
Operator will be “deemed to have resigned without any action by NonOperators, except the selection of a successor.”237 Those Forms recognize,

233. A failure of title can occur under art. IV.B.1 when the parties are not coowners of a single lease, but instead they have each contributed separate leases or
other mineral interests to a group of interests that will be governed by the JOA. In
such circumstances, each party’s individual ownership percentage in the JOA
will, presumably, reflect some agreed upon estimate of the value that the interest
contributed by that party bears to the total value of all the interests governed by
the JOA. A failure of title occurs if it is determined that title to an oil and gas lease
or other mineral interest contributed by a party was invalid as of the effective date
of the JOA. In the event of a failure of title, the ownership percentage (in the JOA)
of the party who contributed that lease is adjusted downward unless the party
timely acquires a new lease or otherwise cures the title failure. For a discussion
of loss of title versus failure of title, see Gary B. Conine and Bruce M. Kramer,
Property Provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN.
SPECIAL INST. ON OIL AND GAS AGREEMENTS: JOINT OPERATIONS (2008).
234. A loss of title occurs under art. IV.B.2 if an oil and gas lease that was
contributed by a party terminates after the effective date of the JOA because some
payment necessary to maintain the lease was not paid. If the party that was
responsible for making the payment cannot obtain a new lease to compensate for
the loss of title, that party’s ownership percentage in the JOA is reduced.
235. If a lease that is subject to the JOA terminates after the effective date of
the JOA because of a failure to develop the lease or to comply with implied
covenants, there is no adjustment of ownership in the JOA.
236. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; 1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; 1977 AAPL 610
art. V.B.1; AAPL 710 art. 4.3; AAPL 810 art. 810; AMPLA cl. 6.2; CAPL cl.
2.02; Rocky Mountain Form 3 art. 4.3.
237. This is contained in art. V.B.3 of the 2015 and 1989 Forms. The 1982 and
1977 Forms each provide in art. V.B.1 that the Non-Operators can remove the
Operator if it “becomes insolvent, bankrupt or is placed in receivership.”
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however, that bankruptcy law or a bankruptcy court might prevent
enforcement of this provision. The Forms provide:
If a petition for relief under the federal bankruptcy laws is filed by
or against the Operator, and the removal of Operator is prevented
by the federal bankruptcy court, all Non-Operators and Operator
shall comprise an interim operating committee to serve until
Operator has elected to reject or assume the agreement to the
Bankruptcy Code.238
If there are only two parties to the agreement, a third person is appointed
to the operating committee, presumably for the purpose of helping avoid
deadlocks on committee votes.239
Other model forms also contain clauses stating either that the party
serving as Operator will cease being Operator in the event that it enters
bankruptcy or becomes insolvent or that the other parties have the right to
remove the bankrupt (or insolvent) party from the position of Operator.240
VI. REMOVAL OF OPERATOR
Most operating agreements allow the Non-Operators to remove the
Operator under certain circumstances. The circumstances under which
removal is allowed can vary from one model operating agreement to
another. Some operating agreements only allow removal for “good cause”
or other specified reasons. Under other operating agreements, no special
reason may be needed for the Non-Operators to remove the Operator. Like
the circumstances (if any) needed to justify removal, the procedures for
removal also will vary based on the particular operating agreement.
The 2015 version of the AAPL Form 610 contains different rules for
removing an Operator that owns an interest governed by the agreement
than for removing an Operator that does not own such an interest.241 The
2015 Form’s rules for removing an Operator that owns an interest are
similar to the rules for removing an Operator under earlier versions of the
AAPL Form 610 (the earlier forms generally presume that an Operator
will own an interest). Below, this Article discusses the general rules for
removing an Operator under the 610 Forms (this includes the rules under
the pre-2015 Forms and the 2015 rules for removing an Operator that owns
238. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.3; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.3.
239. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.3; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.3.
240. 1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; AAPL 710 art.
4.4(a); AAPL 810 art. 4.4.2(c); AIPN art. 4.10.A.1; AMPLA cl. 6.2.D; CAPL cl.
2.02A(a); UKCS cl. 5.3.2(a).
241. See 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.4 (Operator that owns an interest) and art.
V.B.5 (non-owning Operator).
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an interest), and the 2015 Form’s rules for removing a “non-owning
Operator.”
A. General Rules for Removal of Operator Under AAPL Forms
The rules for removal include the substantive requirements needed to
justify removal and the procedures that must be followed to remove an
Operator.
1. The Substantive Grounds Necessary for Removal
The usual circumstance likely will be that the Operator owns an
interest. Under the 2015 and 1989 versions of Form 610, an Operator that
owns an interest “may be removed only” if “good cause” for removal
exists and the Operator fails to “cure the default” that constitutes good
cause within a specified time after delivery of a notice “detailing the
alleged default.”242 The 2015 Form states that “‘good cause’ shall include,
but not be limited to, Operator’s (i) gross negligence or willful
misconduct; (ii) the material breach of or inability to meet the standards of
operation contained in Article V.A.; or (iii) material failure or inability to
perform its obligations or duties under this agreement.”243 The 1989 Form
describes “good cause” in substantively identical language.
The “standard of operation” that is referenced in both the 2015 and the
1989 Forms’ definition of “good cause” is described in identical language
in Article V.A of each Form. The language states that the Operator must
“conduct its activities under this agreement as a reasonably prudent
operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and
dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with
applicable law and regulations.”
The 1982 and 1977 Forms did not refer to “good cause” as a
prerequisite for removal, but those Forms only authorized removal in
certain circumstances. Under the 1982 and 1977 Forms, the NonOperators can remove the Operator “if it fails or refuses to carry out its
duties hereunder, or becomes insolvent, bankrupt or is placed in
receivership.”244 The 1982 and 1977 Forms do not require that the operator
242. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.4. Article XII of the form governs what is
required for a “delivery.”
243. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.4.
244. This provision is contained in art. V.B.1 of each of the Forms. There is
some discussion of “good cause” and cases dealing with this issue in commentary.
See, e.g., Christopher S. Kulander, Old Faves and New Raves: How Case Law
Has Affected Form Joint Operating Agreements—Problems and Solutions (Part
Two), 1 OIL AND GAS, NAT. RES., AND ENERGY J. 165 (2015).
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be given an opportunity to cure the grounds for removal. The 1956 version
of the AAPL Model Form did not expressly provide for removal.
AAPL Form 710 authorizes removal of the Operator in circumstances
similar to the recent 610 forms. The parties may remove the Operator if
the Operator “commits a substantial breach of a material provision of the
operating agreement” and fails to cure it within a specified time, or if the
Operator becomes insolvent.245 Form 710 also authorizes the parties to
remove the Operator if the Operator makes a partial transfer of its working
interest (other than to an affiliate) that is large enough so that the Operator
no longer has the largest working interest of all parties to the agreement.246
The Operator is automatically removed if it ceases to own a working
interest.247 AAPL Form 810 authorizes removal if the Operator commits
“a substantial breach of a material provision” of the joint operating
agreement and, after notice of the breach, either fails to correct the breach
within thirty days, if the breach is one that can reasonably be cured within
that time, or fails to commence a cure within thirty days if the breach is
one that cannot be cured within thirty days.248
2. Procedure for Removal
Under the 2015 and 1989 versions of Form 610, an operator cannot be
removed unless it fails to cure the grounds for removal within a specified
time after receiving notice of the “default.” The pre-removal notice to the
Operator must be in writing.249 The amount of time to which the Operator
is entitled for curing the default depends on the circumstances. The general
rule is that the Operator is entitled to thirty days, but the Operator is only
entitled to forty-eight hours to cure “if the default concerns an operation
then being conducted.”250 As previously noted, the 1982 and 1977 Forms
do not require that the Non-Operators give the Operator an opportunity to
cure.
Subject to the existence of grounds for removal and the Operator’s right
to attempt to cure such “default,” the 2015 and 1989 Forms provide that
Non-Operators can remove the Operator “by the affirmative vote of NonOperators owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on
Exhibit ‘A’ remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator.”251
Similarly, if grounds for removal exist, the 1982 and 1977 Forms allow the
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

AAPL 710 art. 4.4(d).
AAPL 710 art. 4.4(c).
AAPL Form 710 art. 4.3.
AAPL Form 810 art. 4.4.2(b).
2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.4; 1989 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1.
Id.
Id.
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Non-Operators to remove the Operator by the vote of parties “owning a
majority interest . . . remaining after excluding the voting interest of
Operator.”252 But the 1982 and 1977 Forms add an additional requirement—
those Forms require that there be two or more Non-Operators voting for
removal.253 The 2015 and 1989 Forms do not include such a requirement.
Thus, if the Operator has a 40% ownership interest, so that the NonOperators collectively own 60% “after excluding the voting interest of
Operator,” the parties seeking removal of the Operator under Form 610
would need an “affirmative vote” for removal from a majority of the 60%.
In other words, they would need a vote for removal from Non-Operators
holding interests that exceed 30%, assuming that all of the Non-Operators
vote. Further, under the 1982 and 1977 Forms, that vote would need to
come from at least two Non-Operators. If one of the Non-Operators held
a 35% interest, that party’s vote would not be sufficient to remove the
Operator.
It is worth noting that the Forms require an “affirmative vote” of a
majority in interest (after excluding the Operator’s interest), not a majority
in interest of those who choose to vote. Thus, if a Non-Operator fails to
vote or votes to abstain, that non-vote or abstention may effectively work
as a vote against removal. That being said, the AAPL Forms do not attempt
to govern the removal process in minute detail. For example, the Forms do
not specify whether an in-person meeting is required or whether votes by
mail or email are sufficient. The Forms also do not specify whether votes
(assuming that there is a meeting) will be by voice vote or in writing or
who will chair the meeting.
B. Removal of Non-Owning Operator Under 2015 Version of AAPL
Form 610
The 2015 version of the AAPL Form 610 contains special rules for
removing an Operator that does not own an interest governed by the
agreement.254 Such an Operator may be removed in one of two ways. First,
such an Operator “may be removed at any time, with or without good
cause, by an affirmative vote of parties owning a majority ownership
interest” under the agreement.255 This procedure does not require notice or
an opportunity to cure.
Second, if good cause for removal of a non-owning Operator exists,
the Operator may be removed by a vote of Non-Operators owning a
252.
253.
254.
255.

1982 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1; 1977 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1.
1982 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1; 1977 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1.
2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.5.
Id.
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majority of the interest that remains after excluding the interest of any
Affiliate of the Operator.256 Removal of a non-owning Operator under this
second method must follow the removal procedure specified for removing
an Operator that owns an interest.257 Thus, the Operator would have to be
given written notice and time to cure the alleged default.
The special rules for removal of a non-owning Operator are new in the
2015 Form. Before, there was no need for such provisions because the
prior versions of the AAPL Form 610 required that the Operator own an
interest that was governed by the agreement.
C. Forms Used Outside the U.S.
Like the AAPL Forms, model form operating agreements used outside
the United States typically provide that the Operator may be removed in
the event of a serious breach of its duties. The 2012 AIPN Form provides
that the Non-Operators may remove the Operator if the Operator commits
a material breach of the joint operating agreement and, after being given
notice of the breach, either fails to commence a cure within thirty days or
fails to diligently pursue a cure to completion.258 The Form contains blank
spaces that give the parties the chance to choose the percentage vote (in
ownership interest) of the Non-Operators that is required to remove the
Operator and whether a certain number of Non-Operators (by heads) also
must vote in favor of removal in order for the Operator to be removed.259
If the Operator disputes whether it committed a material breach or failed
to cure it, the Operator remains appointed until the matter is resolved as
provided in the agreement’s dispute resolution section (typically by
arbitration).260
The AMPLA Form provides that “[t]he appointment of the Operator
continues [until] the Operator commits a Breach Default Event and fails
to remedy the default within 60 days of service of a written notice of
default served by a [Non-Operator].”261 The Form defines “Breach Default
Event” as including various insolvency events or a “material breach of any
of its material obligations” other than a failure to timely pay money due
under the agreement.262 Clause 5.3.1 of the UKCS form contains a similar
provision.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id.
2012 AIPN art. 4.10.B.
Id.
Id.
AMPLA cl. 6.2(d).
AMPLA cl. 1.1.
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The CAPL Form also has a unique means of removal—the “challenge
of operator.” Clause 2.03.A provides that, if any non-operator party is
prepared to conduct joint operations “on more favourable terms and
conditions,” it can propose that it do so. The existing Operator then has
sixty days in which to agree to operate on the terms proposed by the
challenger (in which case the incumbent Operator remains as Operator) or
to resign (in which case the challenger is obligated to assume the
operatorship on the terms it stated in the challenge). Given that Operators
generally are expected to serve on a “no gain, no loss” basis, it is not clear
that this sort of clause would be useful in many cases, though it is possible
that a challenger would offer to charge less overhead than allowed under
the contract or less for the use of its own personnel and equipment than an
incumbent Operator.
VII. SELECTION OF SUCCESSOR OPERATOR
Most model form operating agreements contain provisions governing
the selection of a “successor Operator.” Often, these include substantive
requirements that parties must own interests governed by the joint
operating agreements in order to qualify for consideration as the successor
operators. In addition, model forms generally contain provisions to govern
the selection procedure.
A. General Requirement that Successor Operator Own an Interest
The 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610 require that
the successor Operator be chosen from amongst the parties to the joint
operating agreement, which seems to limit the allowable candidates to
those who own an interest governed by the joint operating agreement.263
(The 1956 version did not impose such a requirement.)264 The AAPL 710
form also states that the parties must choose any successor Operator “from
amongst the Parties.265
The 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 imposes a general requirement
that the Operator own an interest, but the Form also expressly recognizes
that the parties may choose a “non-owning Operator.”266 The 2015 Form
goes on to state, however, that a “condition precedent” to a non-owner
serving as Operator is that the “non-owning Operator and the Non263. This requirement is found in art. V.B.2 of the 1989, 1982, and 1977
versions of AAPL Form 610.
264. 1956 AAPL 610 art. 20, entitled “Resignation of Operator.”
265. AAPL 710 art. 4.5.
266. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.; A non-owning operator is sometimes called a
“contract operator.”
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Operators must enter into a separate agreement, or insert Article XVI
provisions [into the joint operating agreement], to govern the relationship
between them.”267 Presumably, the parties to the joint operating agreement
must unanimously agree to such a separate agreement or to such Article
XVI provisions as a prerequisite to service of a non-owning Operator.
Although the 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms require that any successor
Operator be chosen from amongst the parties that own an interest, courts
sometimes find that the parties waived this requirement or that they are
estopped from raising an objection to the Operator’s lack of ownership
interest when the parties chose a non-owning party as Operator and one of
the parties did not object until the new Operator served for some time.268
Several other model forms do not expressly state that a successor
Operator must own an interest governed by the agreement, but sometimes
the forms seem to assume that a successor Operator will own such an
interest. For example, clause 2.06 of the CAPL Form provides that certain
circumstances, such as insolvency, will preclude a “Party” from being
appointed as Successor Operator. Companies that are “Parties” to the joint
operating agreement will be owners. Obviously, the intent of Clause 2.06’s
reference to “Party” is not to preclude insolvent owners from being
selected as a successor Operator while allowing insolvent non-owners to
be the successor Operator. Rather, the form simply assumes that the entity
chosen to be the successor Operator will be a “Party” and hence an owner.
B. Procedure for Choosing Successor Operator Under AAPL Forms
If an Operator resigns or is removed, the parties must elect a successor
Operator.269 The parties entitled to vote include all parties that own an
interest at the time the election occurs, including any new parties to whom
the outgoing Operator has transferred its interest. This rule is made explicit
in the 2015 Form, which states, “[t]he successor Operator shall be selected
by . . . parties. . . including . . . the former Operator and/or any transferee(s)
of the former Operator’s interest, to the extent that they are owners within
267. Id.
268. Oklahoma Oil & Gas Expl. Drilling Program 1983-A v. W.M.A. Corp.,
877 P.2d 605, 608 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994); Oil Corp. v. Hillin, 890 S.W.2d 931,
934 (Tex. App. El Paso 1994).
269. The five versions of the AAPL 610 Model Form each provide that, after
an Operator has resigned or been removed, a successor Operator “shall” be
selected by “the parties.” 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.6; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2;
1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2; 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2; 1956 AAPL 610 art. 20.
AAPL Forms 710 and 810 also state that, after resignation or removal of an
Operator, the parties “shall” choose a successor Operator. AAPL 710 art. 4.5;
AAPL 810 art. 4.5.
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the contract area.”270 The prior AAPL Forms were less explicit on this
point, but should be interpreted in the same way. The earlier agreements
refer to the “parties” voting,271 with “parties” broad enough to cover any
entity owning an interest governed by the JOA, even if the entity only
recently acquired an interest.
Indeed, an Oklahoma appellate court reached this result in a case
decided under the 1956 Form. In Duncan Oil Properties, Inc. v. Vastar
Resources, Inc., a new Operator had to be chosen because the former
Operator had assigned its entire interest to Vastar Resources.272 One of the
non-operators argued that Vastar was not entitled to vote. That nonoperator relied on Article 18 of the 1956 Form, which provided, “Should
a sale be made by Operator of its rights and interests, the other parties shall
have the right . . . to select a new Operator.” The non-operator argued that
“other parties” only included the entities that already were parties to the
JOA prior to the former Operator’s sale of its interest. The appellate court
disagreed, suggesting that the word “other” was meant to exclude the
former Operator that no longer held an interest, though it might still be
bound by certain provisions in the JOA.273 As for the assignee of the
former Operator’s interest, the court explained it “is now a party to the
JOA” whose vote should be “counted in the selection of the new
operator.”274 The court also noted that Article 20 referred to the “new
Operator” being selected by “all” parties.275
The election rules contained in the 1977 through 2015 versions of the
AAPL Form 610 have at least four common features: (1) each party that
owns an interest at the time of the election is entitled to vote;276 (2) the
vote of each party is weighted by its ownership percentage; (3) if an
Operator that was removed or is deemed to have resigned fails to vote or
votes to succeed itself, the Operator’s vote is disregarded; and (4) a
candidate for successor Operator must receive the vote of a majority in
interest in order to be elected, or, if the Operator’s voting interest is
disregarded for the reason specified above, the candidate must receive a
majority in interest after excluding the voting interest of the Operator.277
270. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.6.
271. The 1989 version of Form 610, for example, provides that the “[t]he
successor Operator shall be selected by the parties owning a[n] . . . interest.” 1989
AAPL 610 art. V.B.2.
272. 16 P.3d 465 (Okla. 2000).
273. Id. at 468.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 467, 468.
276. This includes new parties to whom an outgoing Operator has transferred
its interest.
277. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.6; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2.; 1982 AAPL 610
art. V.B.2; 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2; 1956 AAPL 610 art. 20.
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These similarities aside, the election procedures in the 1977 though 2015
versions of the Form contain some differences.
The 1989 and 1982 versions of the AAPL Form 610 provide that “[t]he
successor Operator shall be selected by the affirmative vote of two (2) or
more parties owning a majority interest.”278 Thus, the vote of a single party
would not be sufficient, no matter how large that party’s voting interest.
The 1977 Form requires the votes of two or more parties if the outgoing
Operator’s vote is disregarded, but does not appear to require the votes of
two or more when the outgoing Operator’s vote is not disregarded.279 The
2015 Form eliminates the requirement that two or more parties vote for a
candidate in order for that candidate to be elected successor Operator. The
2015 Form states, “The successor Operator shall be selected by the
affirmative vote of one (1) or more parties owning a majority interest.”280
It is possible for the parties to reach a deadlock in the election of a
successor Operator. A deadlock can occur in one of at least four types of
circumstance. The first circumstance is the situation in which a candidate
needs both a majority in interest and the votes of two or more parties. If a
party that holds a majority in interest (or a majority in interest of the votes
that count if the outgoing Operator’s vote is being excluded) votes for a
particular candidate and no other party supports that candidate, then no
candidate will be able to obtain both a majority in interest and the support
of two or more parties. Notably, the 2015 Form eliminates this potential
for deadlock by eliminating the requirement that a candidate receive votes
from two or more parties.
Second, because the Forms appear to require the votes of a majority
in interest, rather than a majority in interest of the parties that choose to
vote, a deadlock could occur if some parties fail to vote or abstain. The
Forms provide for disregarding the vote of an outgoing Operator that has
been removed or is deemed to have resigned if that party fails to vote, but
the Forms do not otherwise provide for disregarding the voting interest of
any party that fails to vote.
A third potential deadlock scenario is possible, though it probably
would be rare. If three or more candidates receive votes, then it is possible
that no candidate would receive a majority even if there are no abstentions
of failures to vote. The Forms do not provide for a run-off, so presumably
multiple rounds of balloting could result in a continuing deadlock in which
more than two candidates receive votes and no candidate receives a
majority.

278. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2.
279. 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2.
280. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.6.
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Fourth, even if there are no abstentions and only two candidates for
successor Operator, a deadlock could occur in the event that each of two
candidates receives 50% of the vote. The 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms do
not provide any procedures for breaking a tie. Presumably, the tie could
only be broken if a party changes its vote. In contrast, the 2015 Form
provides a tie-breaker. The 2015 Form states that, if the “vote results in a
tie, the candidate supported by the former Operator or a majority of its
transferee(s) shall become the successor Operator.”
The 2015 Form does not completely eliminate the chance that a tie
would result in a deadlock. A tie could still result in deadlock if the
outgoing Operator refuses to support either of the candidates (perhaps in a
situation in which the outgoing Operator is voting to succeed itself or
refusing altogether to vote). Or, if the outgoing Operating transfers a
portion of its interest to one or more transferees, while retaining a portion
of its interest, and the “transferee(s)” who received a portion of the
outgoing Operator’s interest reach a deadlock regarding how to break the
tie vote that results when all parties have voted, the deadlock could remain.
Nonetheless, the 2015 Form’s tie-breaker mechanism should greatly
reduce the risk that a tie-vote will result in deadlock.
If there is a 50% to 50% tie-vote, the operation of the tie-breaker seems
reasonably straightforward. But a few questions can arise in other
situations. Suppose, however, that there were three candidates for
successor Operator. Two candidates each received a 40% vote, and the
Operator “supported” the third candidate, who received a 20% vote. Can
the Operator break the tie by choosing the candidate who received the 20%
vote? Alternatively, suppose that one candidate receives 40% of the vote,
another candidate receives 35%, and a 25% interest either abstains or votes
for a third candidate. There is no tie, but there is a deadlock. Could the
outgoing Operator break the tie? If the Operator has multiple assignees, do
they vote by heads or percentage interest? Of course, these scenarios will
probably not occur often, but they could be problematic on rare occasions.
The tie-breaker procedure seems to have merit because it lessens the
chance of deadlock that could be very costly to the parties. On the other
hand, a consequence of the tie-breaker is that whenever a single party owns
a majority interest, that party is given more power, thus reducing the
leverage of the minority owners.
The provision found in the 2015 Form that requires disregarding the
vote of an outgoing Operator voting for itself or refusing to vote also has
merit. This is illustrated by Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd., v. Occidental
Permian Ltd., in which Occidental Permian Ltd. (“OPL”) served as unit
operator under a unit operating agreement.281 OPL owned nearly 75% of
281. 225 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App. 2005).
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the working interests. D.H. Acquisition Ltd. and two other entities that the
court called the “Fasken entities” collectively held between 23% and 24%
of the working interests. Two other companies held less than 1% each.
The parties held a vote to remove OPL as Operator. Under the terms
of the unit operating agreement, the working interest owners could
“remove Unit Operator by the affirmative vote of at least eighty-five
percent (85%) of the voting interest remaining after excluding the voting
interest of Unit Operator.”282 All of the parties other than OPL voted to
remove OPL.283 Thus, the vote was sufficient to remove OPL.
The parties then moved to the selection of a successor. The unit
operating agreement provides that “a successor Unit Operator shall be
selected by the affirmative vote of three (3) or more Working Interest
Owners having at least eighty-five per cent (85%) of the combined voting
interest of all Working Interest Owners, provided no Unit Operator who is
removed may vote to succeed itself.”284 A representative of Fasken
nominated D.H. Acquisition to be the successor operator.285 The parties
other than OPL each voted in favor of D.H. Acquisition, but OPL voted
its 74.67% interest “against” D.H. Acquisition.286 Thus, the affirmative
vote was less than 25%. OPL conceded that it had been removed as
Operator, but it argued that D.H. Acquisition had not been selected as a
successor Operator because it failed to obtain an “affirmative vote of . . .
eighty-five per cent (85%) of the combined voting interest of all Working
Interest Owners.” OPL also asserted that it had a right or duty to continue
serving as Operator until a successor Operator was selected.
The Fasken entities brought suit in a Texas state court asserting
multiple claims, including a claim that OPL breached the unit operating
agreement by continuing to operate and by failing to recognize the
selection of D.H. Acquisition as successor Operator. They argued that
OPL’s vote against D.H. Acquisition was the equivalent of OPL voting for
itself—something prohibited under the parties’ agreement.287
Accordingly, OPL’s negative vote should be disregarded. This would
leave D.H. Acquisition with an affirmative vote from more than 85% of
the voting interests counted.
The appellate court disagreed, concluding that the unit operating
agreement was designed “to ensure” that the selection of a successor
Operator would be based on an “affirmative vote” from a “super-majority”
of the working interest owners. Thus, OPL was entitled to vote against
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Fasken, 225 S.W.3d at 592.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 587.
Fasken, 225 S.W.3d at 587.
Id. at 592-3.
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D.H. Acquisition because such a vote was not the equivalent of OPL
voting for itself. Further, the agreement required that the super-majority
based on the vote of “at least 85 percent . . . of all working interest
owners.” Thus, OPL’s vote could not be disregarded.
C. Other Forms
The 2012 AIPN Form provides that, after removal or resignation of an
Operator, the operating committee must “meet as soon as possible to
appoint a successor Operator.”288 If a party has been removed as Operator
for reasons other than a decrease in ownership interest or a change in
control of the entity, both of which can be grounds for removal under the
AIPN Form,289 both that party and its affiliates are disqualified from
consideration to be the successor Operator.290 The percentage vote needed
for election as successor Operator is to be set by the parties in Article
5.9.291 No party can be appointed as Operator against its will, and
reflecting the fact that many nations require governmental approval before
there is a change in Operator, the AIPN Form provides that the resignation
or removal of a party as Operator and its replacement by a successor
Operator, is not effective until any required governmental approval is
obtained.292
The AMPLA Form provides that when an Operator resigns or is
removed, the parties “must promptly appoint a new Operator.”293 The form
provides that the parties may not reappoint an Operator that has been
removed “for default or following an Insolvency Event.”294 The AMPLA
Form also contains a provision that could help in the event that the parties
reach an impasse in attempting to select a successor operator. In particular,
the form provides that, “[i]f a new Operator cannot be appointed and act
immediately, the [party] holding the largest Participating Interest must act
as interim Operator until the new Operator is appointed and commences
its duties.”295
The selection of a new Operator under the CAPL Form is governed by
Clause 2.06. As a general rule, the election of a party as the new Operator
requires the vote of at least two parties that are not affiliates and which
collectively own more than 50% of the working interests governed by the
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

2012 AIPN art. 4.11.A.
2012 AIPN arts. 4.10.C and 4.10.D.
2012 AIPN art. 4.11.B.
2012 AIPN art. 4.11.A. See also AIPN art. 5.9.
2012 AIPN art. 4.11.A.; 2012 AIPN art. 4.11(E).
AMPLA cl. 6.4(a).
AMPLA cl. 6.4(b).
AMPLA cl. 6.4(c).
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agreement.296 However, a party that owns a 60% or larger interest can
simply elect itself.297 A party cannot be elected as Operator unless it has
given its written consent.298 A party is disqualified from being the new
Operator if that party was replaced as Operator within the past 30 months
or in the event that any of the circumstances exist that would justify
removal of that party as Operator under the CAPL Form.299 If the parties
are not able to timely select a new Operator before the outgoing Operator’s
duty to serve ends, the party (other than the party that is being replaced as
Operator) that has the largest interest generally will serve as Operator in
the interim.300
Clause 5.5 of the UKCS provides for a successor Operator to be
chosen by the operating committee, subject to approval by governmental
authorities and the consent of the party that is selected.301 If no party is
willing to serve as Operator, the agreement treats that as a decision to
abandon the joint operations and relinquish the right to operate that was
received by the granting instrument.302
VIII. TRANSFER OF OPERATORSHIP TO AFFILIATE OF OPERATOR
The 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610 provide that a
change of corporate name or structure, or the “transfer of Operator’s
interest to any single subsidiary, parent or successor corporation shall not
be the basis for removal of Operator.”303 This provision would seem to
allow the Operator to transfer not only its ownership interest, but the
Operatorship to another party, provided that such party is a “subsidiary,
parent or successor corporation.” It also would seem necessary that the
Operator transfer its entire interest to that party. The AAPL 710 Form
contains a very similar optional provision, but the 2015 version of AAPL
Form 610 eliminates this provision.304 Under the 2015 version, there does
not appear to be any right to transfer the Operatorship to an affiliate.
With minor exceptions, the CAPL Form allows the Operator to
transfer the operatorship to an affiliate to which the Operator is also
assigning its ownership interest.305 The 2012 AIPN Form generally allows
296. CAPL cl. 2.06(C).
297. Id.
298. CAPL cl. 2.06(D).
299. CAPL cl. 2.06(B).
300. CAPL cl. 2.06(D). If two parties tie for the largest interest, the one that
has held its interest for the longest time becomes temporary Operator. Id.
301. UKCS cl. 5.5.
302. UKCS cl. 5.6.
303. This is contained in art. V.B.1 of each of those three Forms.
304. AAPL 710 art. 4.4(e).
305. CAPL cl. 2.09.
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an Operator to assign the operatorship to an affiliate, as long as the
Operator is assigning its entire interest to the affiliate.306 Such a transfer
would seem to require operating committee approval under the AMPLA
Form.307
The 1956 version of AAPL Form 610 provided that if the Operator
sold its “rights and interest,” the Non-Operators would have the right,
within sixty days of the sale, to select a new Operator “by a majority vote
in interest,” but that absent such a selection the transferee would serve as
Operator.308 The 1956 version did not distinguish between transfer to an
affiliate and assignment to an unrelated party. Thus, the Non-Operator’s
right to designate a new Operator appears to apply after the Operator
transfers its interest to an affiliate. Likewise, Rocky Mountain Form 3
appears to give the parties the right to select a successor Operator after any
transaction in which the Operator “sell[s]” its entire interest, including
when the transfer is to an affiliate.309
IX. ASSIGNMENT OF OPERATORSHIP TO NON-AFFILIATE
Sometimes the question arises whether an Operator may assign its
right to operate to a Non-Affiliate.
A. AAPL Form 610
The position of Operator is created by contract and comes with certain
contractual rights and duties. As a matter of general contract law, a party
to a contract can freely assign its contractual rights—the consent of the
other party or parties to the contract is not needed.310 There are exceptions
to the free assignability of contracts if the parties have agreed that the
rights cannot be assigned or the contract is one that is deemed purely
personal.311
306. 2012 AIPN art. 4.12.
307. AMPLA cl. 7.7(a).
308. 1956 AAPL 610 art. 18 (this is included in the same article as the
preferential rights provision).
309. Rocky Mountain 3 art. 4.3.
310. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 317; Beattie v. State ex rel.
Grand River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377, 381 (Okla. 2002); Crim Truck & Tractor
Co. v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1992); Somont
Oil, Inc. v. Nutter, 743 P.2d 1016, 1020 (Mont. 1987); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2642.
311. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 317; Beattie v. State ex rel.
Grand River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377, 381 (Okla. 2002); Crim Truck & Tractor
Co. v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1992); Somont
Oil, Inc. v. Nutter, 743 P.2d 1016, 1020 (Mont. 1987); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2642,
2653.
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The 2015 Form expressly provides that the “Operatorship is [not]
assignable.”312 Under basic principles of contract law, this prohibition
should be enforceable. Accordingly, if an Operator purports to assign its
Operating rights, the purported assignment should not have the effect of
actually transferring operating rights. Instead, depending on
circumstances, the purported assignment should be deemed as either a
resignation by the Operator or as having no effect whatsoever.
The express prohibition on assignment of the Operatorship is a
change. The 1989 Form (like the 1982 and 1977 Forms) did not expressly
address whether the Operatorship could be assigned. On the other hand,
certain provisions in those Forms could be read as implicitly making the
Operatorship non-assignable.
In particular, each of the Forms provides that, if the Operator resigns,
all of the parties participate in a vote to select the successor Operator. One
could argue that, if an Operator purports to assign its Operating rights, the
purported assignment is an attempt by the Operator to resign and select its
own successor in violation of the Forms’ provisions that all parties
participate in the selection of a successor Operator. Further, in at least one
situation—that in which the Operator assigns its entire working interest
and also purports to assign the operatorship—the argument that a
purported assignment of the Operatorship violates the terms of the older
AAPL 610 Forms is even stronger. This is because the 1989 and 1982
Forms each provide that, if the Operator “no longer owns an interest
hereunder in the Contract Area,” the Operator will be deemed to have
resigned.313
The argument that the Operator may not transfer the operatorship to a
Non-Affiliate arguably is strengthened by the provision in the 1989
version of AAPL 610 that “[a] change of a corporate name or structure of
Operator or transfer of Operator’s interest to any single subsidiary, parent
or successor corporation shall not be the basis for removal of Operator.”314
Of course, the Operator who makes a purported assignment and the
company that receives the assignment could make counterarguments. If
the Operator purported to assign the Operatorship but retained an interest
governed by the JOA (so that the “deemed resignation” provision does not
apply), the Operator and its assignee could argue that an assignment is not
312. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
313. See 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; 1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1. Article V.B.1
of the 1977 Form contains similar language, but it does not contain the word
“hereunder.” The 1977 Form provides for a deemed resignation if the Operator
“no longer owns an interest in the Contract Area.”
314. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1. This argument would be stronger if the
quoted provision stated that a transfer to an affiliate would not result in automatic
termination, rather than saying it would not be a basis for removal.
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a resignation. Accordingly, there was no resignation and therefore no basis
for applying the procedure for selecting a successor Operator upon the
resignation of an Operator.
Further, even if the Operator assigned its entire interest along with the
Operatorship, the Operator and its assignee could argue that there was no
resignation. Suppose, for example, that a hypothetical Operator, “XYZ
Corp.,” simultaneously assigned its working interest and Operatorship to
NewCo Corp. In such a case, XYZ and NewCo could argue that the
Operator never had zero interest because neither XYZ nor NewCo held the
position of Operator at a time when it had zero interest. XYZ held a
working interest up until the time that it assigned the Operatorship and
NewCo received a working interest at the same time that it received an
assignment of the Operatorship.
There is very little case law on the assignability of the Operatorship
under the AAPL Forms. Some cases have held that, if an Operator
assigned the Operatorship and the other parties did not timely object, those
parties either waived the election requirement or were estopped from
complaining about the lack of an election.315 Of course the application of
waiver or estoppel theories under appropriate facts is not very remarkable.
But in at least one case, a court held that the Operatorship is assignable. In
Santa Fe Energy Operating Partners, L.P. v. Universal Resources Corp.,
two parties that each owned a fifty percent interest in certain oil and gas
properties entered a joint operating agreement, with Santa Fe Energy being
the Operator.316 The parties appear to have used the 1982 Form.317 Several
years later, Santa Fe assigned its working interest and its rights under the
operating agreement to Bridge Oil Company. The Non-Operator
(Universal Resources) filed suit in a Texas state court, arguing that Santa
Fe could not assign its rights as Operator.
The trial court agreed and entered judgment for Universal. The
appellate court reversed, but not based on the sort of potential argument
outlined above. A contractual right can be non-assignable for one of two
main reasons—the contract is purely personal or the parties have agreed
that it will be non-assignable. The appellate court addressed both
possibilities. The court concluded that the Operatorship was not purely

315. Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tex. App.
El Paso 2000).
316. 1996 WL 457251 (Tex. App. 1996).
317. The court did not state what form was being used, but the court quoted
“Article V(B)(1)” from the parties’ contract. The 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms
each have slightly different wording in art. V.B.1, and the language quoted by the
court appears to match the 1982 Form.
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personal, cited three cases that it said supported this conclusion, and then,
without further analysis, declared that it agreed.318
Although the court’s opinion was short on analysis, the court’s
conclusion that the Operatorship is not purely personal is probably correct.
A contract is purely personal when “the duties imposed upon one party
[are] of such a personal nature that their performance by someone else
would in effect deprive the other party of that for which he bargained.”319
A classic example of a purely personal contract is one in which a party has
contracted for a performance by a particular “artist or author whose skills
and talents are unique.”320
The appellate court likewise concluded that the operating agreement
itself did not bar assignment of the Operatorship. Universal argued that
Article V.B.1 made the Operatorship non-assignable, but the court
summarily dismissed the argument without seriously analyzing it. The
court supported this result by breezily asserting that a provision in Article
XVI of the JOA that the agreement was binding on successors and assigns
would be rendered meaningless if Article V.B.1 was interpreted as making
the Operatorship non-assignable.
But the appellate court’s assertion is plainly wrong. Even if the
Operatorship was non-assignable, the agreement’s Article XVI still would
have meaning because the working interests governed by the operating
agreement apparently were assignable. The working interests are generally
assignable and Universal does not appear to have argued that Santa Fe
could not assign its working interest—only that Santa Fe could not assign
the Operatorship. Thus, although plausible arguments exist in favor of the
result reached by the court, the court’s reasoning was clearly flawed.
Nonetheless, the result stands as authority that the Operatorship is
assignable under the 1982 AAPL Form. And given that the relevant
provisions of the 1989 and 1977 Form are similar to those in the 1982
Form, Santa Fe could also be cited as authority to support an argument
that the Operatorship is assignable under those Forms too.
In contrast to the conclusion reached by Santa Fe, some prominent oil
and gas lawyers have concluded that the 1982 and 1989 AAPL Forms
make the Operatorship non-assignable, at least in the cases in which an
Operator transfers its entire working interest to someone else.
For example, in 2008, Professors Ernest Smith and John Lowe wrote
that Article V.A of the 1989 Form “clearly contemplates that the choice of
a new Operator is at the option of the JOA participants, rather than the
318. Santa Fe, 1996 WL 457251 (Tex. App. 1996).
319. Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1957).
320. Earth Prod. Co. v. Oklahoma City, 441 P.2d 399, 404 (Okla. 1968)
(rejecting contention that contract relating to removal of sand was purely
personal).
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outgoing operator” who no longer owns an interest, and that “an
assignment of operating rights is contrary to the contractual procedure for
selecting a successor operator.”321 They also seem to suggest that an
assignment of operating rights, although not “expressly preclude[d]” by
the language of the 1989 Form, is inconsistent with the expectations
implied by the language of the Form.
A prominent practitioner, in discussing the standards for deemed
resignation of the Operator in the 1989 Form, states:
The second standard, “no longer owns an interest in the Contract
Area,” is used frequently. It is this standard which prohibits a party
who is the Operator from passing operatorship to a purchaser or
assignee. The operatorship is personal to the party and cannot be
assigned. When the Operator assigns its interest it “no longer owns
an interest in the Contract Area” and it thus has no right to retain
or assign operatorship. A successor Operator must be selected
pursuant to Article V.B.2.322
Another prominent practitioner addressed the Santa Fe decision directly.
He suggested that the authorities cited by Santa Fe support the proposition
that the rights and duties of an Operator are not purely personal, and
therefore the Operator’s “rights to operate are generally assignable” absent
a contrary provision in the joint operating agreement.323 He concluded,
however, the holding of Santa Fe was wrong because the AAPL Forms’
change in Operator provisions supersede both the general assignability of
contract rights and Article XVI’s assignment clause “in the context of a
sale of all of the Operator’s interest.”324
An additional provision in the 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms that
suggests that the Operatorship is generally not assignable is the provision
that provides that the Operator’s transfer of its interest to “any single
subsidiary, parent or successor corporation shall not be the basis for
removal of Operator.”325 If the Operatorship generally was assignable, this
provision would not be necessary.

321. See supra note 207.
322. Andrew B. Derman, THE NEW AND IMPROVED 1989 JOINT OPERATING
AGREEMENT: A WORKING MANUAL 31-2 (this is No. 15 in the American Bar
Association’s “Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law Section
Monograph Series”).
323. Timothy W. Dowd, A.A.P.L. Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement: Selected Provisions Impacting Onshore Producing Property
Interests, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 47 (2001).
324. Id.
325. This is contained in art. V.B.1 of each of those three Forms.
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Finally, as noted in the section above on transfer of the Operator’s
interest to an affiliate, the 1956 Form allowed the assignment of the
Operatorship when the Operator sold its interest, but subject to the other
parties’ right to choose a new Operator within sixty days of the sale.326
B. AAPL Offshore Forms
Neither AAPL Model Form 710 nor Form 810 expressly prohibit
assignment of the operatorship, but each provides that the parties to the
operating agreement must choose a new Operator in the event that the
Operator resigns (or is removed).327 A purported assignment of the
position of Operator would effectively be a resignation, combined with a
simultaneous transfer of the operatorship to a Successor Operator chosen
by the outgoing Operator. Thus, a purported assignment would be
inconsistent with the offshore forms’ stipulation that, after a resignation
by the Operator, the successor Operator is chosen by the parties. One could
argue that an assignment of the operatorship does not involve a resignation
by the outgoing Operator, and that an assignment of the Operatorship is
permissible, but any such argument seems inconsistent with the
expectations within the industry.
C. International Forms
The 2012 AIPN Form prohibits the Operator from assigning its rights
and duties as Operator to a Non-Affiliate.328 The CAPL Form generally
does likewise.329 The UKCS Form does not expressly address assignment
of the operatorship, but much like the AAPL offshore forms, it seems to
anticipate that the parties as a whole, not the outgoing Operator alone,
choose any successor Operator.330
The AMPLA Form states that “[t]he Operator may delegate to a Third
Party, including an Affiliate, any of its rights, remedies, powers,
discretions and obligations, provided that . . . the Operator may only
delegate the whole of its rights, remedies, powers, discretions and
obligations with the approval of the Operating Committee.”331 This would
prohibit a general assignment of the operatorship, absent consent of the

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

1956 AAPL Form 610 art. 18.
AAPL Form 710 art. 4.5; AAPL 810 art. 4.5.
2012 AIPN Form 4.12.
CAPL cls. 2.02(A)(g) & 2.09.
UKCS cl. 5.5.
AMPLA cl. 7.7.
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Operating Committee.332 The AMPLA Model Form requires an Operator
who has delegated rights or obligations to inform the Operating
Committee at its next meeting of the delegation and the “identity of the
delegate.”333 The Form states that a delegation does not relieve the
Operator of any of its obligations.334
CONCLUSION
Often, multiple companies either co-own the oil and gas exploration
and production rights in a particular area or they separately own such
rights in nearby areas that the companies have decided to explore and
develop in a coordinated fashion. In these circumstances, the companies
sometimes enter joint operating agreements to govern the exploration and
development process and to define their respective rights and duties with
respect to one another. Such agreements are common throughout the
world, and they constitute one of the most important types of contracts that
relate to oil and gas exploration and production.
Several model forms exist and are commonly used as the basis for joint
operating agreements, though some parties draft their own agreements.
Although parties often “customize” their operating agreements by altering
some terms in the model forms, the use of model forms saves transactional
costs because parties become familiar with their terms. Moreover, the
forms are drafted to handle various issues in ways that are generally
accepted as commercially reasonable within the oil and gas industry,
neither unduly favoring the party that serves as Operator or the parties who
are Non-Operators. These factors combine to save drafting and negotiating
time, and improve the likelihood that negotiations will result in agreement.
Probably the most common forms used for onshore operations in the
United States are various versions of the AAPL Model Form 610 (the form
has been updated several times over the years). The most recent version is
the “2015 Form.” Other AAPL Forms are designed for use offshore.
Outside the United States, the 2012 AIPN Form is commonly used. Also,
other model forms are common in specific jurisdictions.
Under virtually all joint operating agreements, a single party that is
called the “Operator” is given both the right and duty to conduct all
operations. Important issues relating to the Operatorship include: the
332. If interpreted literally, this provision arguably would allow an Operator
to assign the Operatorship to a Non-Affiliate, provided that the Operator retained
some portion of its original obligations. For example, if the Operator retained the
right and obligation to operate one well, the Operator might be able to assign all
of its remaining rights and obligations.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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Operator’s duties, the standard of care to which an Operator is held, and
the nature of the relationship between the Operator and Non-Operators.
Virtually all model forms attempt to have the Operator serve on a “no gain,
no loss” basis. The “no gain, no loss” principle provides that the Operator
should neither make a profit nor incur a loss because of its service as
Operator. Instead, the party that serves as Operator will make a profit or
incur a loss based solely on its status as one of the owners of the oil and
gas rights being developed.
Although there are some substantive differences between the
provisions in different model form joint operating agreements, the
similarities in terms are striking. One of the reasons for similarities
between model forms is that the drafters of one model form considered the
language of prior forms during the process of drafting a new form. Further,
whether a joint operation is taking place in the southern United States, the
Rockies, or in some other country, many of the same commercial
considerations and balancing of interests between Operators and NonOperators will apply. Further, the similarities are probably driven by the
fact that the oil and gas industry is, in part, an international industry, rather
than a multitude of separate oil and gas industries in each jurisdiction or
productive basin, and thus some of the industry’s customs, norms, and
expectations remain constant from one jurisdiction to another.
Model forms typically try to ensure that the Operator, in the conduct
of its duties as Operator, will be characterized as an independent
contractor, rather than as an agent of the parties. Further, the model forms
attempt to avoid the existence of a partnership or similar relationship
between the parties. Rather than a partnership or similar relationship, the
parties attempt to remain mere co-owners (or, in common law terms,
“tenants in common”) who use the joint operating agreement to govern the
exploration and development of their co-owned asset. In this way, the
parties seek to have their relative rights and duties to one another governed
by the joint operating agreement and the standards established by it, rather
than standards imported from the laws governing partnership, principalagency relationships, or fiduciary relationships.

